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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I examine the ex post and ex ante benefits of conservatism to lenders and
borrowers in the debt contracting process. First, I argue that conservatism benefits lenders ex
post through a timely signal of default risk in the form of accelerated covenant violations by
more conservative borrowers. I present evidence that the likelihood of a covenant violation
following a negative shock increases in borrower conservatism. Second, I argue that
conservatism benefits borrowers ex ante through lower initial interest rates. I provide both in-
sample and out-of-sample evidence that lenders offer lower interest rates to more conservative
borrowers. The result is robust to controlling for a series of other earnings attributes.
Thesis Supervisor: S.P. Kothari
Title: Gordon Y Billard Professor of Accounting
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1. Introduction
Positive accounting theory suggests that accounting conservatism plays an efficiency-
enhancing role in the debt contracting process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Watts, 2003a,
2003b). However, there is little systematic evidence on the contracting benefits of conservatism.
In this paper, ][ provide evidence on the contracting benefits of conservatism in the debt
contracting process. Specifically, I test both the ex post and ex ante benefits of conservatism to
lenders and borrowers. I argue that lenders benefit from conservative reporting ex post through a
more timely signal of default risk in the form of accelerated covenant violations by more
conservative borrowers. In exchange, lenders offer lower initial interest rates ex ante to those
borrowers who commit to or have a reputation for more conservative reporting.
In the debt contracting process, lenders are less informed than the borrowers, and they face
downside risk but no upside potential. A borrower's limited liability and potential to behave
opportunistically add to the lender's downside risk. In an efficient lending market, lenders favor
mechanisms that mitigate their downside risk. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that
accounting conservatism is one such mechanism.
One important implication of conservatism is that bad news is reported in a more timely
fashion than good news in financial reports (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a, 2003b). Since lenders
and borrowers contract on the financial reports through financial covenants, conservative reports
enable lenders to receive a more timely signal of deteriorating financial performance through a
tightening of covenants or a triggering of covenant violations. The timely signal of deteriorating
financial performance allows lenders to take protective action, thereby reducing their downside
risk. Examples of protective action that lenders can take include: accelerate the debt, reduce the
borrowing base, enhance the security, and/or adjust the interest rate to reflect the underlying risk.
5
In the cross-section, each borrower chooses its optimal level of conservatism based on the trade-
off of benefits and costs. I expect that lenders of more conservative borrowers receive the signal
of deteriorating performance, in the form of covenant violations, sooner than lenders of less
conservative finns. Using a sample of 339 firms that experience at least one negative shock in
1999 or 2000, I find consistent results across four measures of conservatism that the likelihood of
a covenant violation following a negative shock increases in borrower conservatism. I also find
some evidence that more conservative borrowers violate covenants sooner.
Ex ante, in expectation of the benefits from conservative reporting, lenders decide whether to
share the benefits with borrowers. I expect lenders to share the benefits from conservatism with
conservative borrowers. Any lender who resists passing on the related benefits would be outbid
by other lenders that offer better terms.
Lenders can offer different options to share the expected benefits from conservatism, such as
]lowering the interest rate, increasing the lending amount, extending the maturity, loosening the
covenants, etc. Which option(s) end up being used in practice is an empirical question. In this
paper, I empirically examine the interest rate option while controlling for other options. I predict,
ceteris paribus, that the interest rate decreases in the borrower's level of conservatism. The
evidence is strong and consistent across different measures of conservatism that lenders lower
the interest rate for more conservative borrowers in the negative shock sample. To provide a
robustness check:, I also test whether conservatism reduces the cost of debt using a broader
sample, i.e., all syndicated loans with financial covenants covered by SDC Platinum Global New
Issues database, and I find similar results.
To address the concern that conservatism is merely a proxy for other earnings attributes, I
also examine additional earnings attributes that can potentially affect the cost of capital. In
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addition to conservatism, the attributes are quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness,
timeliness, and relevance of earnings. Francis et al. (2004) find that favorable values of each
attribute lower the cost of equity individually; however, conservatism does not reduce the cost of
equity when all seven attributes are included in the analysis.' Based on conservatism's role in
mitigating lenders' downside risk, I expect conservatism to reduce the cost of debt after
controlling for the other six earnings attributes. I find that conservatism, persistence, and
smoothness incrementally reduce the cost of debt.
My paper is the first to test the contracting benefits from conservatism in debt contracting.
Prior claims in the literature that conservatism plays an efficient contracting role have yet to be
substantiated with supporting evidence. Ahmed et al. (2002) are the first to document the ex ante
benefit of conservatism to borrowers, i.e., that conservatism reduces the cost of debt. 2 However,
my paper tests not only for the ex ante benefit of conservatism to borrowers but also for the ex
post benefit of conservatism to lenders, i.e., a more timely signal of default risk as reflected in
quicker triggering of covenant violations. My analysis therefore depicts a broader picture of the
efficient role that conservatism plays in debt contracting.
In theory, by restricting the borrowers and their managers from engaging in value-decreasing
activities, such as asset substitution and under-investment, conservative reporting creates an
efficiency gain by reducing the dead-weight loss from moral hazard and adverse selection. To
prove the existence of such an efficiency gain, it has to be shown that the state with conservatism
Pareto-dominates the state without conservatism; the benefits and costs of conservatism to all
financial statement users have to be weighted. My findings that lenders receive a timely signal of
Francis et al. (2004) do not examine the effect of seven earnings attributes on the cost of debt.
2 See Section 2 for a detailed discussion of Ahmed et al. (2002).
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default risk and that borrowers obtain a lower interest rate from conservative reporting are
consistent with the predictions out of the efficiency gain; however, these findings do not directly
prove the existence of such an efficiency gain.
In general, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issues accounting standards that are
consistent with conservatism principle.3 However, recently the FASB has shown a tendency
toward providing fair values, thus introducing unverifiable estimates in financial statements
(Watts 2003 a & b).4 The evidence in this paper indicates that at least one group of financial
statement users, i.e., lenders, value conservatism over value relevance by reducing the interest
rates for more conservative borrowers. The evidence in this paper might be of interest to
standard setters when they make the tradeoff between relevance, which favors fair value, and
reliability (verifiability), which calls for conservatism.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 develops
the hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the sample and research design. Section 5 provides
empirical evidence and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes with suggestions for future
research.
3 For example, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to be Disposed Of
(SFAS 121, 1995), Employer's Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions (SFAS 106, 1992),
Research and Development Arrangements (SFAS 68, 1982).
4"Over the past several years, the Financial Accounting Standards Board has been pushing to base accounting on
the fair market value of assets and liabilities. Little by little, in statement after statement, the board has required
more and more fair market valuation, moving away from historical cost." ("FASB proposes guidance on fair value
methodology," Accounting Today Vol. 18, No. 13, July 26, 2004.)
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2. Background literature
Prior research provides strong theoretical guidance on the contracting benefits from
conservatism. However, the evidence in this avenue is limited. In this section, I first briefly
review the theory and then summarize two empirical papers that are closely related to my study.
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) describe the role of accounting information in the debt
contracting process. However, the voluminous empirical literature building on Watts and
Zimmerman (1986) largely focuses on the use of accounting choices to avoid covenant violations
(Press and Weintrop, 1989; Duke and Hunt, 1989; DeAngelo et al., 1994; Sweeney, 1994;
Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Beatty and Weber, 2003). Researchers seem to have overlooked the
positive role that accounting information plays in debt contracting with only a few exceptions
(Asquith, Beatty, and Weber, 2004). In this paper, I provide evidence that accounting
conservatism creates some benefits that lenders and borrowers share; therefore, it is to the
advantage of both parties to have conservative reporting.
Watts (2003a, 2003b) summarizes the theory and evidence on the debt contracting
explanation for accounting conservatism. He points out that lenders are concerned with the
downside risk, thus they concentrate on the lower end of the earnings and net asset distributions.
With the verifiable measure of net assets that is provided by conservative reporting, lenders can
make better lending decisions and effectively monitor borrowers' ability to pay. Watts (2003a)
also suggests, "The long survival of conservatism and its apparent resilience to criticism strongly
suggests that conservatism's critics overlook its significant benefits." However, the literature
provides no evidence on the benefit of conservatism to lenders and presents only limited
evidence on the benefit of conservatism to borrowers.
9
Ahmed et al. (2002) are the first to document that conservatism reduces the cost of debt for
borrowers, i.e., more conservative borrowers receive better debt ratings. In addition to examining
whether and how conservatism benefits lenders, my paper also improves the test of whether
conservatism reduces the cost of debt for borrowers in the following three aspects. First, Ahmed
et al. (2002) use debt ratings as the proxy for the cost of debt. I use actual interest rates since the
debt rating of a borrower at a random point in time does not necessarily capture the cost of
various facilities of the same borrower.
Second, Ahmned et al. (2002) use two measures of conservatism. Their market-to-book
measure may be noisier than the asymmetric timeliness measure in capturing conservatism
because market value contains rents (Roychowdhury and Watts, 2004). Their accrual-based
measure is based on total accruals while accumulated nonoperating accruals better capture a
firm's level of conservatism (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). I use two asymmetric timeliness measures
from Basu (1997) and two earnings measures (skewness and cumulative nonoperating accruals)
from Givoly and Hayn (2000) to proxy for conservatism and obtain consistent results across each
measure. In the robustness tests, I also use market-to-book as an additional measure of
conservatism and find that even though firms with a higher market-to-book ratio are no more
likely to violate their covenants than firms with a low market-to-book ratio, firms with a higher
market-to-book ratio receive a lower interest rate upfront. There are two possible explanations:
1) the lower interest rate reflects the higher conservatism as proxied by higher market-to-book,
but market-to-book does not predict covenant violations due to the part of the variation in the
market value that is irrelevant to conservatism; 2) the lower interest rate reflects the lower risk as
proxied by higher market-to-book, not the reward to conservatism.
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Third, Watts (2003b) points out that the Ahmed et al. (2002) study suffers from an
endogeneity problem, i.e., both the level of conservatism and the debt rating may be affected by
the same firm characteristics simultaneously. My test for the benefit of conservatism to lenders is
less subject to the endogeneity problem since I measure the benefit as the likelihood of covenant
violations as a result of or following an exogenous shock. My test of whether conservatism
reduces the cost of debt is not fully immune to the endogeneity problem.
In a second related paper, Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) demonstrate that variation in
conservatism mimics variation in contracting demands as proxied by the common and code law
foundations. However, they do not offer direct evidence on the source (i.e., benefits) of the
contracting demand for conservatism. My paper complements their study by providing evidence
on why contracting parties demand conservatism. I argue that borrowers with higher levels of
conservatism mitigate the lender-borrower conflict of interest to a greater degree.5 Borrowers
and lenders enjoy the benefits from conservatism in the form of a low cost of debt and mitigated
downside risk, respectively.
In sum, the existing literature agrees that conservatism plays an efficient role in the debt
contracting process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Watts, 2003a, 2003b) and establishes that
contracting demand influences the supply of conservatism (Ball et al., 2000). However, there is
no empirical evidence on whether and how conservatism benefits lenders. Moreover, there is
only weak evidence that conservatism benefits borrowers by reducing the cost of debt (Ahmed et
al., 2002). My study adds to the literature by providing evidence on whether and how
conservatism benefits lenders, and whether and how lenders share the benefits with borrowers.
5 Firms supply various levels of conservatism because of the various costs they face. See Section 3 for a detailed
explanation on the cost of conservatism.
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The results confirm the accounting theory that conservatism creates some benefits that are shared
between lenders and borrowers.
3. Hypotheses development
Efficient debt contracting provides an important explanation for conservatism. In the debt
contracting process, lenders have an informational disadvantage and bear downside risk with no
upside potential. Therefore, lenders refuse to lend or require a high rate of return unless
investors/managers can credibly mitigate the downside risk facing the lenders. Accounting
conservatism is one such mechanism that borrowers use to mitigate the lenders' downside risk.
3.1 Definition of conservatism
To investigate the role of conservatism in the debt contracting process, I elect to use the
empirical definition proposed by Basu (1997) that conservatism requires a higher degree of
verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses. An important
implication of the asymmetric verification requirement is the understatement of net assets.
lBearing downside risk but no upside potential, lenders prefer to see an understated net asset on
the balance sheet and a timely report of bad news on the income statement to protect them from
the downside risk.
Statement of Concepts No. 2 of the FASB offers the explanation that "if two estimates of
amounts to be received or paid in the future are about equally likely, conservatism dictates using
the less optimistic estimate". The definition of asymmetric verification requirement is consistent
with the FASB's explanation for conservatism. By requiring a higher degree of verification to
recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses, conservative accounting
numbers are less optimistic.
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There are other definitions of conservatism. For example, Statement of Concepts No. 2 of the
FASB defines conservatism to be "a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that
uncertainty and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered". This official
definition of conservatism is vague and hard to be operationalized. Conservatism is also defined
as "a selection criterion between accounting principles that leads to the minimization of
cumulative reported earnings by slower revenue recognition, faster expense recognition, lower
asset valuation, and higher liability valuation" (Wolk et al., 1989; Davidson et al., 1985;
Stickney and Weil, 1994). This definition does not specify the benchmarks for "slower, faster,
lower, and higher"; the absolute, deliberate, consistent understatement of net assets and profits is
unlikely to be demanded by lenders as a precondition for lending money to firms.
.3.2. The covenant violation hypothesis: the expost benefit of conservatism to lenders
As an efficient mechanism to reduce lenders' downside risk, conservatism is believed to
reduce the cost of debt, thereby providing borrowers an incentive to report conservatively. To
understand how conservatism reduces the cost of debt, it is important to examine whether and
how conservatism benefits lenders. In other words, the benefit of conservatism to lenders is a
necessary condition for lenders to incorporate a borrower's level of conservatism into debt
pricing.
Lenders are concerned about two types of potential losses, i.e., uncompensated risk and loss
of principal (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, Chapter 8). First, lenders fear that they might be
exposed to greater risk than that for which they are compensated. Without any constraints, after
the loan is in place, borrowers have an incentive to engage in asset substitution, i.e., replace low
risk projects with high risk projects (especially when equity value approaches zero). Given an
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informational disadvantage, lenders may not detect such substitutions in time and thereby bear
uncompensated risk. Second, lenders risk the loss of principal. A lender's payoff is bounded
from above at the principal plus accumulated interest, no matter the diversification of their loan
portfolio. The full recovery of other loans cannot make up for the loss from a defaulted loan. The
potential for opportunistic borrower behavior such as asset substitution and underinvestment
adds to the lender's concern about the recovery rate.
Conservatism is an efficiency-enhancing mechanism that complements debt covenants to
mitigate a lender's concern about uncompensated risk and loss of principal. Holding the debt
covenant threshold constant, conservative reporting makes financial covenants more binding by
capitalizing bad news. The binding covenants provide lenders with a more timely warning of
increased default risk and trigger covenant violations when the risk exceeds the threshold set by
lenders. 6 Following the warning in the form of a covenant violation, lenders can take protective
actions to reduce their downside risk.7 For example, lenders can adjust the interest rate to
compensate for the uncompensated risk. Lenders can also accelerate the debt, reduce the
borrowing base, and/or enhance the security to reduce the potential loss of principal. I offer
examples of lenders' protective actions in Appendix 1.
In sum, conservative reporting benefits lenders through quicker triggering of covenant
violations. The transfer of control rights from borrowers to lenders after covenant violations
enables lenders to reduce their downside risk. I therefore operationalize the benefits of
6
6 Suppose lenders believe that the outcome of a particular project follows an uniform distribution [a,b]. A timely
report of a large economic loss c (c < a) would inform the lenders that the actual risk of the project is higher than
their expectation and would trigger the covenant violation. Notice that this also works if the firm reports good news
with less verification: A surprisingly good draw will also make lenders realize that the actual risk of this project is
higher than they were promised; however, the outcome is in their interest and in this case, they do not choose to
exercise their control rights immediately.
7 Performance pricing is a mechanism built into many loan contracts to automatically act on changes in the
borrowers' risk profile.
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conservatism to lenders as accelerated covenant violations. To increase the likelihood of
detecting covenant violations, I require the sample firms to experience at least one negative
shock. I predict, ceteris paribus, after a negative shock, more conservative firms are more likely
to violate their financial covenants, and I predict that they violate their covenants sooner.
Hypothesis la (Hla). Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of a covenant violation following a
negative shock increases in borrower conservatism.
Hypothesis lb (Hlb). Ceteris paribus, more conservative borrowers violate their covenants
sooner than less conservative borrowers.
Due to the endogeneity of covenants, covenant thresholds may vary across borrowers with
different levels of conservatism. Ex ante, it is not clear whether lenders adjust covenants in
response to various accounting choices, especially when accounting choices are contingent in
nature and contracting on all the contingencies is difficult, if not impossible. If the timely signal
from quicker triggering of covenant violation is the only benefit from conservatism to lenders,
lenders might adjust covenants to incorporate conservatism by doing the following. They might
loosen covenants to the maximum degree that the likelihood of covenant violations is the same
for more conservative and less conservative borrowers. Beyond that point, the net gain to lenders
from conservatism is negative, and the lender will not loosen the covenants further. As a result,
loose covenants alone will not cause the likelihood of covenant violations of conservative
borrowers to be lower than the likelihood of less conservative borrowers. Nevertheless, the
restrictiveness of covenants does affect the likelihood of covenant violations; therefore, I include
covenant slack as a control in testing H 1 a and H 1 b.
I acknowledge that the timely signal from quicker triggering of covenant violation is only
one possible benefit conservative reporting provides lenders. By understating net assets,
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conservative reporting also provides lenders a measure of the lower bound of the value of the
collateral, and the understated collateral might increase the recovery rate in default. This
alternative benefit of conservatism may also contribute to the lower interest rates.
3.3. The cost of debt hypothesis: the ex ante sharing of the benefit from lenders
If conservative reporting provides lenders a more timely signal of default risk, lenders are
likely to reduce the interest rates charged to more conservative borrowers in exchange for the
mitigated risk. Moreover, the more conservative the borrower, the greater the benefits to the
lenders given greater mitigation of the default risk. Therefore, it should follow that the reduction
in the interest rate for conservative borrowers is greater than that for less conservative borrowers.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Ceteris paribus, the cost of debt is lower for more conservative
borrowers.
Note, however, four assumptions have to be true for H2 to be true: (i) lenders do not share
the benefits from conservatism with borrowers exclusively through other channels such as
relaxed covenants, (ii) lenders prefer an earlier default than a later one, (iii) borrowers commit to
a certain level of conservatism and do not deviate from the committed level after the loan is in
place, and (iv) there is variation in the level of conservatism among borrowers.
To address the first assumption, I acknowledge that lenders are likely to reward conservatism
through other channels such as covenants, lending amount, security, etc. Which option(s) lenders
choose is an empirical question. The existence of other channels work against H2 and a lower
interest for more conservative borrowers only means that the actual sharing of the benefit from
conservatism might even be larger.
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To address the second assumption, I argue that lenders prefer an early default rather than a
later one to a certain degree. A timely default warns a lender about the increased default risk and
protects the lender from the downside risk; however, extremely frequent default gives lenders
false alarms and increases the monitoring cost and renegotiation cost. Therefore, there exists an
optimal frequency of default which minimizes the sum of default cost, monitoring cost, and
renegotiation cost. If conservative reporting drives the actual default rate toward this optimal
point then lenders value conservatism. On the other hand, if conservative reporting drives the
actual default rate away from this optimal point then I should not observe lenders factoring
conservatism into their pricing.
To address the third assumption, I argue that borrowers have an incentive to maintain their
level of conservatism due to the potential reputation cost. Borrowing is a repeated game in which
borrowers have to anticipate the consequences of their actions on their future borrowing terms.
Moreover, borrowers have a contracting mechanism to credibly commit to a certain level of
conservatism. An example of such commitment is the use of fixed GAAP in the covenants
(Mohrman, 1996; Beatty, Ramesh, and Weber, 2002).8 Both the reputation cost and contracting
mechanism help to keep borrowers at the committed level of conservatism.
Prior literature shows that managers have incentives to manipulate accounting numbers to
avoid covenant violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). I acknowledge that
such opportunistic behavior of management potentially works against H2. Rational lenders
should be able to factor the possibility of manipulation into interest rates. The reduction in
interest rates for conservatism should be higher if borrowers/managers can commit not to engage
in any accounting manipulation.
8 Fixed GAAP refers to provisions that ensure that the terms of the contract will be unaffected by future mandatory
and/or voluntary accounting method changes (Mohrman, 1996).
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To address the fourth assumption, I argue that there exists variation in the level of
conservatism due to the cost of conservatism. First, conservative firms are more likely to violate
their covenants, and the costs associated with covenant violations are economically significant.
Beneish and Press (1993) document that "default and renegotiation costs reflected in stock prices
represent an average of 1.4% of the market value of equity." Second, conservative earnings
understate net assets by recording economic losses more quickly than gains. As a result,
conservative earnings are more likely to result in a loss or a decrease in earnings in the year of
economic losses. Recent evidence shows that the market rewards firms for gains or increases in
earnings but severely punishes those firms for losses or decreases in earnings (Barth, Elliott, and
Finn, 1999; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2001). Third, conservatism imposes costs on managers if
their compensation is sensitive to accounting choices or if managers believe there might be
adverse consequences to their choices in the labor market. With unclear economic significance,
the last two costs affect managers' decisions as long as they believe the costs exist. Envisioning
various cost structures, I expect to observe a wide range of conservatism that satisfies the
demand of lenders for conservatism to various degrees, leading to cross-sectional variation in the
reduction of interest rates.
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4. Data and research design
4.1. Measures of conservatism
Following the empirical definition of asymmetric verification requirement, I measure the
level of conservatism by the ranks of the following four measures, two of which I derive from
Basu (1997) and two from Givoly and Hayn (2000).
The first measure of conservatism is the relative sensitivity of earnings to bad news
compared to good news: f0i' +fi from the firm-specific earnings-returns regression
,-i / Pi,, = ao + a DR, + ,8iRi, + j1 R,, * DRi, + 1, (Basu, 1997), where E,, is the earnings per
share (Compustat data 58) of firm i in fiscal year t, P,_, is the price per share of firm i at the
beginning of fiscal year t, Ri, is the twelve-month return of firm i ending three months after the
end of fiscal year t, and DRi, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if R,, < 0 and 0 otherwise. Under
the asymmetric verification requirement, where bad news has a lower verification standard, bad
news should be reflected in earnings in a more timely manner than good news. If stock returns
summarize the news arrival and positive (negative) returns indicate economic gains (losses) over
a specific time period, then earnings of a conservative firm should track negative returns more
than positive returns. In an earnings-returns regression, a positive coefficient on the interaction
term (negative return dummy interact with the return), /,i3, indicates that earnings are more
sensitive to bad news (negative returns) than good news (positive returns). To control for the
variation in the sensitivity of earnings to good news, I use the relative coefficient 0i + ' to
0i
measure the degree of conservatism: firm conservatism increases in the magnitude of this ratio.
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The second measure of conservatism is the relative explanatory power of bad news compared
to good news: R2 (bad news) / R2 (good news) of the same regression above. I include this
measure to control for the difference in the variance of negative vs. positive returns. Since
returns are bounded below, negative returns have a lower variance than positive returns. In an
earnings-returns regression, R2 = ( ,, ) , where R, could be positive or negative. The
var(E,) var(R,)i
difference in the variance of positive and negative returns is taken care by the var(Ri,) term in
the relative R2 measure.
The above two measures from Basu (1997) capture the essence of accounting conservatism,
i.e., asymmetric verification requirement, which is exactly what lenders care about to reduce
their default risk. A high verification standard for gains ensures the gains to be more reliable and
less prone to manipulation than losses; at the same time, a low verification standard for losses
gives lenders a timely signal of the default risk and a lower bound of the value of the collateral.
However, Basu's measures have their limitations. The ability of Basu's measures to pick up
aggregate conservatism is questionable, especially over short periods of time (Roychowdhury
and Watts, 2004). Also, Basu's measures, when applied to individual firms, are potentially
subject to considerable measurement error or a downward bias (Givoly, Hayn, and Natarajan,
2004). Therefore,, I use another two earnings-based measures to ensure that the results are not
driven by specific measures.
The third measure of conservatism is the time-series skewness of earnings (Compustat
datal72) relative to the skewness of cash flows (Givoly and Hayn, 2000)9. When bad news
9 If Compustat data308 is available then cash flow equals to data 308. If data 308 is not available, then cash flows
are equal to Funds from operations (datal 10) - Acurrent assets (data4) - Adebt (data34) + Acurrent liabilities
(data5)+ Acash (datal).
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requires a lower verification standard, it is usually capitalized into earnings, generating a large
reduction in earnings and thus a negatively skewed earnings series. °0 Skewness of earnings also
captures the asymmetric verification requirement as reflected in the characteristics of earnings,
yet it does not rely on whether stock returns are a good proxy for economic gains or losses.
The fourth measure of conservatism is the signed accumulation of nonoperating accruals
deflated by accumulated total assets (Givoly and Hayn, 2000) The accumulation of
nonoperating accruals summarizes the actual recording of bad news through accruals. Examples
of nonoperating accruals where the bad news is capitalized include restructuring charges and
asset write-downs.
The problem with these two earnings-based measures is that while conservative reporting
leads to negatively skewed earnings and the accumulation of negative nonoperating accruals, the
converse may not hold - negatively skewed earnings and accumulation of negative nonoperating
accruals are also consistent with a "big bath," which is earnings manipulation rather than
accounting conservatism. Note that although these two measures do not result from estimation,
they are still sensitive to the time series available.
Figure 1 provides the timeline for the measures of conservatism as well as other main
variables. As can be seen from Figure 1, I measure conservatism for the period up until the loan
initiation. When lenders and borrowers negotiate the loan, they can only contract on the
historical level of conservatism. I assume that after the loan initiation, firms cannot do either of
the following: change their level of conservatism due to the lack of accounting slack or elect not
10 See Appendix 3 for a simple simulation to quantify the intuition.
l Nonoperating accruals are defined as Total accruals - Operating accruals, where Total accruals = Net income
(data172) + Depreciation (datal4)) - Cash flow from operations(data308), or Total accruals = Net income(datal72)
+ Depreciation(datal4))- Funds from operations (datal 10) + Acurrent assets (data4)+ Adebt (data34) - Acurrent
liabilities (data5) - Acash (datal) and Operating accruals = AAccounts receivable (data2) + AInventories (data3)+
APrepaid expenses (datal60) - AAccounts Payable (data70) - ATaxes Payable (data7 1).
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to change their level of conservatism due to the reputation cost. I also assume that lenders may
employ fixed GAAP in debt contracts to reduce the accounting slack. Under these two
assumptions, if a borrower has been conservative before the loan initiation, this borrower is
mostly likely to be conservative after the loan initiation and provide lenders a timely signal about
the change in the default risk.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In Appendix 4, I demonstrate the relation between Basu's measures of conservatism and the
two earnings measures of conservatism. The empirical evidence in Appendix 4 provides some
assurance that the four measures are evaluating a similar underlying construct. Nevertheless, the
empirical results on all four measures still need to be interpreted with the pros and cons in mind.
,4.2. Sample selection
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. I start from the CRSP universe in year
1999 and 2000. The choice of 1999 and 2000 yields both a bounded five-year window (1999 to
2003) over which to search for covenant violations and sufficient room (1994 to 1999) to search
for original debt contracts. To provide a powerful test on whether the likelihood of covenant
violations increases in conservatism, I require that the sample firms experience at least one
negative shock, defined as a significant price drop. Specifically, I extract from CRSP 4,339 firms
with at least one monthly return less than -30% during 1999 and 2000. The choice of -30% as
the cutoff point yields those firms with one or more monthly returns that are approximately two
standard deviations lower than the mean.1 2
1:2 The mean and standard deviation of all available monthly returns on CRSP are 0.7% and 15%, respectively.
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To avoid including firms with no debt or immaterial debt, I exclude firms with long-term
debt of less than 10% of total assets, yielding a sample of 1,786 firms. The sample is further
reduced to 515 firms after I require at least seven years of earnings and returns data prior to the
shock to calculate firm-specific measures of conservatism. Then I manually collect from firms'
10K, 10OQ, and 8K filings in Lexis-Nexis information about whether and when these firms
violated their financial covenants after the negative shock(s). 13
I obtain loan information, including covenants, from SDC, Lexis-Nexis and 10Ok Wizard.'4 To
identify the original debt contract, I require all contracts to start before the negative shock and
span the covenant violations for violators. The sample used to test Hla consists of 327 firms,
among which 98 firms disclose violations of financial covenants subsequent to the shock(s). To
test Hla using ConsvR 2, which requires at least three positive or negative returns to run the
regression separately for positive and negative return periods, I exclude 18 firms with less than
three positive or negative returns. Test of Hlb is based on 279 firms whose covenant violation
dates can be identified. Again, to test Hlb using Consv_R2 , I exclude 13 firms without enough
data to run the regression separately for positive and negative return periods. Test of H2 is based
on 314 firms, a sub-sample of the 327 firms, whose initial spread is available. To test H2 using
Consv_R 2, I exclude 17 firms with less than three positive or negative returns.
[Insert Table 1 here]
13 I use search terms such as "covenant** w/5 violat***," "technical default," "default w/5 covenant*," "not comply
w/5 covenant*," and "compl***** w/5 fail w/5 covenant*."
14 Regulation S-K 601 (b) (4) (ii) requires the disclosure of all instruments defining the rights of holders of long-term
debt of the registrant and its consolidated subsidiaries with the exception of long-term debt less than 10% of total
assets. See Appendix 2 for the detailed disclosure requirement by SEC. To find the covenants, I first run a search
with keyword such as "covenant," "financial covenant," "negative covenant," "affirmative covenant," "credit
agreement," etc. For those firms whose covenants I cannot locate by keyword search, I go to the Exhibit index
contained in their 10K around year 1999 to look for the reference to the existence of any significant debt contract
and then go to the referred report to find the contract.
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4.3. Research design
4.3.1. Test of Hia
To test whether more conservative firms are more likely to violate their financial covenants
(Hla), I estimate the following probit model:
Violate, = a + a, Consvi + ,l 1Cumreti + 2,Sizej + ,33Leveragei + ,34ROAi + , 5ANW + P6 ALevi
+ fi7,Rating + ,8 Numcov, + ,39Escalate, + ,,Otherdebt, + ,, Loansizei + ,,2Month _ to _ maturity, + i . (la)
The dependent variable Violate equals one if the firm discloses a violation of financial
covenants after the negative shock(s) and zero otherwise. HI a predicts that a, > 0.
The treatment variable, i.e., level of conservatism Consv, is measured as one of the
following: 1) the relative coefficient '° i, + / i from the firm-specific earnings-returns regression
70,
E,i / Pit = a0 + a DR, + oiRi, +/ ,8R, * DRj, + ,; 2) the relative explanatory power of bad
news compared to good news: R2 (bad news)/ R2 (good news) from the same regression above;
3) the time-series skewness of earnings relative to the skewness of cash flows; and 4) the signed
accumulation of' nonoperating accruals deflated by accumulated total assets. The control
variables are defined below.
Since the two Basu measures are from estimation of a reverse earnings-returns regression
using time-series data, they are potentially noisy and measured with error. To avoid spurious
inference from these noisy measures, I use the ranks of each measure instead of the magnitude in
all the tests. And each measure is constructed so that a higher rank corresponds to a higher level
of conservatism. To further mitigate the noise or measurement error in each single conservatism
measure, I also combine these four measures into an aggregate summary measure of
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conservatism for each firm. The aggregate conservatism measure is computed as the average
15
rank of the four individual conservatism measures
There are firm-specific and loan-specific variables that also affect the likelihood of covenant
violations. The firm-specific variables include the size of the negative shock, the size, the
leverage, the financial performance, and the credit worthiness of the firm. The loan-specific
variables include the tightness of the covenants, the size of the loan and the maturity of the loan.
Table 2 provides the definition of all the variables used in the tests.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The control variables are:
Cumret is the size of the negative shock(s) that a firm experienced during 1999 or 2000. As
the covenant violation may be directly related to the shock, the larger the negative shock, the
more likely a firm will violate its covenants. Cumret is measured as the magnitude of the
negative return; the greater the measure, the less negative the return and the smaller the shock. If
a firm experienced multiple shocks, Cumret is the buy-and-hold return of all the shocks.
Size is the size of the firm prior to the negative shock. A larger firm is usually stronger, able
to negotiate looser terms in covenants, and able to build more accounting slack. Therefore, a
bigger firm is less likely to violate its covenants, everything else equal. Size is measured as the
natural log of the total assets (Compustat data6) of the borrower at the fiscal year end right
before the negative shock.
Leverage is the leverage ratio of the firm prior to the negative shock. A highly levered firm
might have more covenants and tighter covenants so that it is more likely to violate its covenants.
However, a highly levered firm also bears a higher cost of covenant violations and may be more
15 Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki (2003) uses the average rank of four individual earnings management measures to
mitigate the noise or measurement error associated with the individual measures.
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careful either not to violate its covenant or to obtain a waiver quicker. Therefore, it is a two-sided
test. Leverage is measured as the long-term debt divided by total assets (data9/data6) of the
borrower at the fiscal year end right before the negative shock.
ROA is the return on assets of the firm prior to the negative shock. A firm's ROA
summarizes the firm's performance over a fiscal period. A firm with a higher ROA is financially
sound and less likely to violate its covenants. ROA is measured as net income for the fiscal year
divided by the total assets of the borrower at the fiscal year end before the shock (datal 72/data6).
ANW is the change in the net worth from the period of loan initiation to the period of the
negative shock. I use this variable to capture the net worth covenant slack. An ideal measure of
covenant slack is the difference between actual financial and covenant threshold for the most
binding covenant. Due to the diversified nature of covenants and the customized definitions of
covenants, such an ideal measure is not practical. To control for the covenant slack to some
,degree, I use the difference between the actual net worth prior to the shock and the actual net
worth before loan initiation assuming that the actual net worth before the loan initiation is a good
proxy for the net worth covenant threshold. The covenants are more likely to be looser for firms
with an increased net worth from loan initiation than those with a decreased net worth. Therefore
][ predict a negative coefficient on this variable. ANW is measured as the net worth before the
negative shock minus the net worth before the loan initiation, deflated by the net worth before
the loan initiation.
ALev is the change in the long-term debt ratio from the period of loan initiation to the period
of the negative shock. This is another variable to capture the covenant slack. The covenants are
more likely to be more stringent for firms with an increased leverage ratio from loan initiation
than those with a decreased one. This is because these firms are closer to their leverage ratio
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threshold, ando because these firms have more debt and presumably more covenants. Therefore I
predict a positive coefficient on this variable. ALev is measured as the leverage before the
negative shock minus the leverage before the loan initiation, deflated by the leverage before the
loan initiation.
Rating is the credit worthiness of the borrower. A firm's credit rating is a summary statistic
offered by the rating agency to evaluate the overall default risk of a firm. The worse the rating,
the more likely a firm will violate its covenants. Rating is measured as the actual S&P long-term
debt rating from COMPSTAT when available. When the actual rating is not available, I calculate
an imputed rating by estimating a regression of all available S&P ratings on firm size, leverage,
ROA, loan size., and loan maturity and then applying the estimated coefficients to the loans
whose actual rating is not available. 16 The Rating is measured right before the loan initiation to
reflect the perceived risk of the new loan. The variable is constructed so that larger values of
Rating correspond to worse credit worthiness.
Numcov is the number of covenants a firm is restricted by. The larger the number of financial
covenants is there in the debt agreement, the more likely a firm will violate its covenants. Again,
an ideal measure of the tightness of the covenants should be the distance between the actual
financial number and the covenant threshold, for the most binding covenant. However, due to the
diversified nature of financial covenants and the customized definition of covenants, such an
ideal measure is difficult to calculate. Numcov is measured as the number of financial covenants
in the original debt contract.
I'' The adjusted R2 of the estimation regression is 44.9%. The imputed rating is calculated as 19.33+ 0 .23*loansize
+-0.0026*loanmonth- 1 .4*revolv-7.26*roa+2.57*lev- 1.283 *size.
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Escalate is whether the covenant is escalating or not. An escalating covenant has a moving
threshold over time, and usually becomes more binding over time. 17 A firm is more likely to
violate an escalating covenant than a non-escalating one. Escalate is measured as a dichotomous
variable equal to one if any covenant is escalating and zero otherwise.
Otherdebt is whether the same borrower has other outstanding loans. If a firm has multiple
loan facilities, or other forms of debt financing, the firm potentially has other financial covenants
and/or cross-default clause. Also a firm with other loans might have tighter covenants, and is
therefore more likely to violate its covenants. Otherdebt is measured as a dichotomous variable
equal to one if the same borrower has other loans and zero otherwise. The identification of other
debt is the following: if the same borrower has other loan facilities outstanding covering
approximately the period betweenl999 and 2003 in SDC, or if 10K, 10Q or 8K filings from
Lexis-Nexis mentions other debt outstanding, then Otherdebt is one.
Loansize is the size of the loan relative to the size of the borrower. Lenders might impose
closer monitoring and tighter covenants to larger loans relative to the size of the borrower. At the
same time, the cost of covenant violation is higher for the borrower, and the borrower tries not to
violate the covenants for larger loans. Therefore, it is a two-sided test as to the effect of loan size
on the probability of covenant violations. Loansize is measured as the principal divided by the
total assets of the borrower before the negative shock. Note that the principal for a revolving loan
is the committed maximum credit line instead of the actual drawing from the credit line. There
are two reasons for using the committed credit line: 1) Even though the interest rates only apply
17 For example, the loan agreement entered on September 11, 1998 between Metatec Corporation and Bank One
requires that the company, on a consolidated basis, shall maintain at all times a ratio of Funded Debt to EBITDA
MINUS CAPEX of not more than the following: September 11, 1998 - June 30, 1999: 3.00 to 1.00; July 1, 1999 -
December 31, 1999: 2.00 to 1.00; January 1, 2000 - Termination Date: 1.50 to 1.00.
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to the used fund, a commitment fee is applied on the unused portion. 2) Covenants are written
against the maximum commitment.
Month_to maturity is the number of months between the negative shock and the maturity of
the loan. A firm is more likely to violate its covenants if it has a longer effective period of
covenants.
4.3.2 Test of HI b
H lb hypothesizes that more conservative firms violate their financial covenants sooner. In
other words, HIlb predicts that ceteris paribus, more conservative firms have a shorter duration
until covenant violations than less conservative firms. The variable of interest therefore is the
following. For violators, it is the duration from the negative shock to the covenant violation. For
non-violators, it is the duration of the experiment (from the negative shock to the end of the
search for covenant violations) or the duration of the loan (from the negative shock to the loan
:maturity date), whichever is shorter. Since the dependent variable is time, I use the hazard
analysis which treats time explicitly.'8 Specifically, I estimate the widely used Cox proportional
hazard model (Cox, 1972), where the hazard rate does not vary over time and the functional form
of baseline hazard is not required.
The generic form for a Cox proportional hazard model is lnh(t) =a(t)+,liX, where
hi(t) represents the hazard, i.e., the instantaneous risk of an event, a(t) is the baseline hazard,
and X represents the predictors for the event, time-constant or time-varying. Reorganizing the
equation yields another form of the same model: h(t) = ea(i) ePx = ho(t)e x . An important feature
18 Hazard analysis is also known as event history analysis, survival analysis, and duration time analysis. It originates
fiom biostatistics and engineering. It concerns the survival until a non-reversible event occurs. Examples include
death from cancer, or light bulb burnout. Explanatory variables for the event occurrence are often called covariates
in the hazard analysis. An advantage of hazard model over OLS regression for cross-sectional data is its ability to
use time-varying explanatory variables.
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of the Cox proportional hazard model is that at any time, the ratios of the hazards of any two
hi (t) h° (t)eAXi ePX-observations remain constant: h( = ( = C
h(t) ho(t)e6 x j eax i
To test HIb, the hazard model is specified as
In hi (t) = a(t) + a, Consv, + ,, Cumret, + ,2 Size + p, Leverage + /4 ROA, + ,, ANW +, 6ALevi
+ ,37 Rating, + ,88 Numcov, + ,, Escalate, + ,,, Otherdebt, + l,, Loansize, + P32 Month _ to _ maturity, + . (1 b)
where h(t) represents the instantaneous risk of covenant violations, at time t for borrower i
conditional on i surviving to time t, and a(t) is the baseline hazard. Hlb predicts that ar > 0,
i.e., the hazard of covenant violations increases in the borrower's conservatism.
Compared to the probit regression, the hazard model uses the information in the timing of the
covenant violations rather than just the occurrence of the violations, providing more insights
-about the interaction between conservatism and covenant violations. Compared to a regular OLS
regression with the time to violation as the dependent variable, the hazard model corrects for the
right-censoring problem, yielding unbiased estimates on the covariates. 19
To test this hazard model, I identify the date of the first covenant violation after the negative
shock(s). If the firm reports a covenant vilation, then I define a variable Num_quarter as the
number of quarters within which the firm reports the covenant violation from the first negative
shock. If the firm does not report covenant violation within the search period, I define
Num__quarter as the number of quarters between the first negative shock and the maturity date, or
between the first negative shock and the end of the sample period, i.e., May 31, 2003, whichever
is shorter.
1' Right censoring occurs when some observations may have an event after the data collection period.
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4.3.3. Test of H2
To test whether the cost of debt decreases in the level of borrower conservatism (H2), I
estimate the loan-specific OLS regression
Spreadi = a0 + 3,1Consvi + /82Size, + /33Leverage, + ,34ROA, + l35Rating, + ,l 6Numcov + 37 Escalate,
+ 38Otherdebti -+ 3Loansize + OlLoanmonthi + f 1,,Revolver, + ,2 PPi + ,3 PP * Consvi + i . (2)
The dependent variable is the initial LIBOR spread of each loan and the treatment variable is
again the level of conservatism. H2 predicts that f,i < 0.
In determining the price, lenders consider the firm-specific risk and loan-specific risk. I use
Size, Leverage, ROA, Rating to proxy for firm-specific risk, where these variables are measured
right before loan initiation. I use Numcov, Escalate, Otherdebt, Loansize, Loanmonth, Revolver,
PP to proxy for the loan-specific risk. Numcov, Escalate, Otherdebt, Loansize are defined the
same as in the probit regression above. Loanmonth, Revolver and PP are three new control
variables I obtain from either SDC or 10K, 10Q or 8K filings that further describe the
characteristics of the loan.
Loanmonth is the length of loan in months. The effect of loan maturity on loan pricing is an
unsettled issue. 'There are two competing hypotheses: the tradeoff hypothesis and the credit
quality hypothesis. Under the tradeoff hypothesis, lenders are willing to offer long-term loans to
risky borrowers at higher spreads. Under the credit quality hypothesis, less risky borrowers
signal their credit quality by taking long-term loans, suggesting a negative relation between
spreads and maturity. Due to the offsetting effect of these two hypotheses, I do not predict the
sign on the variable.
Revolver is a dichotomous variable equal to one for revolving loans and zero otherwise.
There are two types of loans in the sample: revolving loans and term loans. For each firm, I
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choose the revolving loan facility covering the most part of 1999 to 2003, if there is a revolving
loan. If not, I take the term loan covering the similar period.
PP is a dichotomous variable equal to one for performance pricing loans and zero otherwise.
Performance pricing has become a popular feature in corporate loans since the 1990s (Asquith,
Beatty, and Weber, 2004). Under performance pricing, the cost of debt is directly tied to a pre-
specified measure of the borrower's credit risk. As a result, the lender's risk is further reduced. It
is still unknown whether the performance pricing and debt covenants are substitutes or
complements. I include an indicator variable PP to tease out the effect of performance pricing on
the cost of debt. I also include an interaction term PP*consv to provide additional evidence on
how performance pricing affects the sensitivity of the cost of debt to conservatism.
5. Empirical results
This section is organized as follows. Section 5.1 provides the descriptive statistics and simple
correlations among variables. Section 5.2 presents the test results for the covenant violation
hypothesis (Hla and Hlb) and the cost of debt hypothesis (H2). Section 5.3 provides six
robustness checks.
5.1. Descriptive statistics and simple correlations
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the negative shock sample. In Table 3 Panel A, I
present statistics on the magnitude of four measures of conservatism. However, I use the ranks of
these four measures to test all hypotheses to avoid spurious inferences. I also use the average
rank of the four ranks in all of the tests to reduce the reliance on individual measures and to
mitigate the noise in individual measure.
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[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 3 Panel A shows the mean, median, first quartile, third quartile, and standard deviation
of the key variables. The average firm in the negative shock sample has total assets of $348.31
million, a long-term debt ratio of 33%, and an ROA of 2%. In contrast, the average firm on
Compustat in fiscal year 1998 has total assets of $126.75 million, a long-term debt ratio of
10.4%, and an ROA of 1.1%. Compared to the average firm on Compustat, the average firm in
my sample is slightly larger, more profitable and more levered. It is not surprising that my
sample firms are more levered since I impose a 10% lower bound on the leverage ratio.
To reconcile the fact that the firms which experience an average of -54% loss in market
capitalization in two years appear larger and more profitable than the Compustat population, I
argue that and find evidence that accounting measures lag behind the stock returns. One year
after the negative shock, the median size of my sample firms drops to $329.4 million, and the
median ROA drops to 1.4%. Two years after the negative shock, the median size of my sample
firms goes up to $355.45 million, and the median ROA drops to 0.57%. Three years after the
negative shock, the median size of my sample firms goes up to $395.56 million, and the median
ROA further drops to -1.1%. It seems that ROA catches up with the shock slowly in several
years.
On average, the loan in my sample has a principal of $50 million, about 17% of the average
borrower's total assets. Note that in the case of a revolving loan, the principal is not necessarily
the amount a borrower draws down. The average maturity of the loans in the sample is four
years, longer than the average maturity of the loans in the SDC database. The average spread of
the loans in the sample is 150 basis points over LIBOR, which is 45 basis points higher than the
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average spread of the loans in SDC. The higher spread indicates that my sample loans might be
riskier than the loans on SDC.
The variable month_to_maturity has a median of 23 months, indicating that on average the
negative shock occurs in the middle of the loan maturity, which has a median of 48 months. On
average it takes a violator five quarters to disclose a covenant violation.
Table 3 Panel B lists the industry composition of the negative shock sample. The sample
firms cover all industries, with 29.7% in the Plastic, Glass and Metal industry, 18.4% in the
Wholesale and Retail industry, and 15.9% in the Computers and Electronics Industry.
Table 3 Panel C presents the Pearson correlation matrix of the variables. Table 3 Panel C
reveals positive correlations between each measure of conservatism and the likelihood of
covenant violations, indicating that more conservative firms are more likely to violate their
covenants. In addition, the likelihood of covenant violation is positively correlated with the size
of the shock and the tightness of the covenants, and it is negatively correlated with the size of the
borrower and the debt rating of the borrower.
Some measures of conservatism correlate with others significantly, and some do not. For
example, Coeff rank is significantly correlated with R2_rank and Negskewrank, and
Negskew_rank is significantly correlated with Accrual_rank. However, the correlations between
Coeff rank and Accrual_rank, between Negskewrank and R2_rank, and between Accrual rank
and R2 _rank are not significant. I have three reasons to still believe that these four measures
capture a similar underlying construct. First of all, these four measures fall into two groups, one
group depending on the earnings-returns relation and the other depending on the earnings
properties. The two measures under each group significantly correlate with each other. Second,
even though the individual measures in each group do not correlate with all measures in the other
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group, the average rank of each group is significantly correlated with the other. Third, Appendix
4 shows that firms with negatively skewed earnings report bad news more timely. Also firms
with negative accumulated non-operating accruals also report bad news more timely. The
evidence in Appendix 4 provides some reassurance that these four measures are in line with each
other, at least at a group level.
The initial spread is significantly negatively correlated with three measures of conservatism:
R2 rank, Negskew_rank, and Accrual rank. In terms of borrower characteristics, the initial
spread decreases in ROA and firm size and increases in leverage and debt rating. In terms of loan
characteristics, the initial spread decreases in loan maturity and increases in the number of
covenant items and escalating covenants.
In sum, descriptive statistics provide preliminary evidence that more conservative firms are
more likely to violate their covenants after a negative shock and more conservative firms enjoy a
lower cost of debt. These findings are consistent with the predictions in Hi and H2, but a more
definitive analysis requires a multivariate regression approach.
5.2. Multivariate testing results
Table 4 presents a probit regression of the likelihood of covenant violations on the level of
conservatism and other control variables (Eq. (la)). The five columns only differ in the proxy for
conservatism. For all five measures (Coeff_rank, R2_rank, Negskew_rank, Accrual_rank,
Avgrank), the coefficients on conservatism are significantly positive, indicating that more
conservative firms are more likely to violate their covenants after a negative shock. As to the
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economic significance of the result, the firms in the third quartile of the relative R2 (ConsvR 2 )
are 9.89% more likely to violate covenants than the firms in the first quartile.2 0
This result obtains after controlling for other factors that affect the likelihood of covenant
violations. Those factors include the size of the shock, the tightness of covenants (change in net
worth, change in leverage, number of covenants, escalating covenants, the existence of other
debt), size, leverage, profitability, debt rating of the borrower, loan size, and loan maturity. Table
4 shows that larger negative shocks, more covenant items, smaller size of the borrower, and
smaller loan sizes are associated with a greater likelihood of covenant violation. The pseudo R2
of the probit regression is 12.2% when conservatism is measured by the average rank of the four
measures.
Table 4 therefore provides evidence that conservatism benefits lenders by providing a timely
signal of the increased default risk as indicated by covenant violations. Lenders value the timely
signal of the increased default risk because they can either take action to reduce their default risk
or require compensation for the increased default risk. To entertain the possibility that violators
report less conservatively when approaching violations to avoid the associated violation cost, I
argue the following. First, lenders have a contracting mechanism, such as fixed GAAP, to
maintain conservatism at a certain level. Second, borrowers would like to sustain the reputation
of being conservative to facilitate future debt financing. Third, accounting changes to avoid
covenant violations can be detected. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that possible earnings
management to avoid covenant violations works against finding the results summarized in Table
4.
2' The economic significance is evaluated by the marginal probability, calculated as the parameter estimate
(a+X)
multiplied by a standardization factor e 2 , where a + x is the predicted probabilities from the probit
2regression.
regression.
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[Insert Table 4 here]
Taking the prediction of Hla one step further, I predict that more conservative borrowers
violate their financial covenants sooner (Hlb). Since the variable of interest is the time until
"failure", i.e., covenant violations, I use the hazard model approach. Table 5 reports the results
from the hazard model estimation. The coefficients on Negskew_rank and Accrual_rank are
positive, meaning that the hazard of a covenant violation increases with these two measures of
conservatism. In this hazard regression, the only significant control variable is borrower size;
larger borrowers have smaller hazard of violating their covenants.
The evidence on Hlb is not particularly strong in the sense that the two other measures of
conservatism fail to yield significant results. One possible reason for the weak results is that the
,dependent variable Num_quarter is measured with noise; a firm only discloses the violation at
the fiscal quarter-end while it may have violated its covenants at the beginning of the fiscal
quarter.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Table 6 provides evidence on whether lenders lower the cost of debt to reward conservative
borrowers (H2). I find that the coefficients are significantly negative for all four measures of
conservatism. For example, the coefficient on R 2 rank is -0.23, significant at the 5% level.
Economically, this coefficient means that the cost of debt is 38 basis points lower for the firms in
the first quartile of R2_rank than the firms in the third quartile.21 Meanwhile, the initial spread for
loans with performance pricing is lower than that of loans without performance pricing, because
performance pricing reduces credit risk by linking the spread to a pre-specified credit risk
measure. And the relation between the loan spread and the level of conservatism is marginally
21 The economic significance has to be interpreted with caution. The average initial spread of the negative shock
sample is 150 basis points, 45 basis points higher than the average initial spread of all loans on SDC.
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less negative for loans with performance pricing, indicated by positive coefficients on PP*consv
for the three measures of conservatism Coeffrank, Negskew_rank, and Accrual_rank at the 5%,
10%, and 10% level respectively. Therefore, there is potentially some substitutability between
performance pricing and the debt covenants, in the sense that lenders do not lower the interest
rate for more conservative firms as much if there is performance pricing in the debt contract.
For the firm.-specific control variables, the significantly positive coefficient on credit ratings
indicates that borrowers with better ratings enjoy a lower cost of debt. For the loan-specific
control variables, loans with escalating covenants usually have a higher cost of debt and that
revolving loans have a lower cost of debt.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Collectively, the evidence from the negative shock sample demonstrates a comprehensive
picture of the efficient contracting role that conservatism plays in the lending process. More
conservative borrowers are more likely to violate their financial covenants, thereby providing
lenders a more timely signal of the increase in default risk; in return, lenders reward more
conservative borrowers with a lower interest rate up front. Performance pricing, the new
contracting feature, complicates the picture by further reducing the credit risk of lenders and the
sensitivity of loan spreads to the level of accounting conservatism.
38
5.3. Robustness checks
5.3.1. Out-of-sample evidence on whether conservatism reduces the cost of debt
One caveat with respect to the negative shock sample is the generalizability of the inference.
To provide a robustness check on the result from the negative shock sample, I use a larger
sample to test whether conservatism reduces the cost of debt (H2).22
Table 7 provides the sample selection process. I start from all the syndicated loans on SDC
from 1994 to 2003. I argue that conservatism benefits lenders through timely covenant violations
that provide lenders a timely signal of default. Therefore I exclude loans without any financial
covenants. Out of 72,067 loan issues on SDC from 1994 to 2003, 8,055 issues have financial
covenants. 23 The sample size drops to 6,279 issues after I exclude issues without initial spread
over LIBOR. After imposing the data requirement on earnings and returns series, I obtain the
final SDC sample of 1,974 loans representing 1,156 borrowers.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Figure 2 presents the distribution of major types of financial covenants in the sample. As can
be seen from Figure 2, the net worth and the interest coverage ratios are the two most frequently
used financial covenants. Out of 13,227 loan facilities with covenants, 6,113 (46.2%) loans have
net worth covenants and 6,109 (46.2%) loans have interest coverage covenants.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics, industry composition, and correlations of the SDC
sample. Table 8 Panel A indicates that on average, lenders charge 125 basis points over LIBOR
22 The SDC sample provides an opportunity to test the relation between the cost of debt and the level of
conservatism out of sample. However, I cannot replicate the violation test on the SDC sample due to the lack of
covenant violation data.
23 SDC starts offering detailed information on debt covenants as of 1994. Also, credit agreements prior to 1994 are
not available on Lexis-Nexis or 10K Wizard.
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on loan issues from 1994 to 2003, which is lower than the initial spread of the negative shock
sample. It shows that loan issues in the negative shock sample might be riskier than the SDC
sample. Table 8 Panel A also reveals that borrowers in SDC sample are relatively larger and
more profitable than those in the negative shock sample and that loans in SDC sample have
longer maturity than those in the negative shock sample.
Table 8 Panel B shows that the SDC sample has a similar industry composition as the
negative shock sample: 23.7% of the issues in the Plastic, Glass and Metal industry, 15.6% in the
Wholesale and Retail industry, and 10.4% in the Textile, Furniture, Printing & Publishing
industry. The two samples only differ in that the Computer and Electronics industry is more
represented in the negative shock sample than in the SDC sample. Due to the economic
,downturn in the Computer & Electronics industry, it is not surprising that more firms in that
industry incur a negative shock during 1999 and 2000. Since the Computer & Electronics
industry does not dominate the negative shock sample, I do not foresee any bias induced by this
difference on the tests using the negative shock sample.
Table 8 Panel C, the correlation table, indicates that the initial spread is negatively correlated
with all four measures of conservatism. Also, the spread is lower for borrowers with a larger
size, a lower leverage, a higher ROA, and a better debt rating. The spread is also lower for
revolving loans, shorter loans, and loans with performance pricing terms. In addition, high
spread loans come with more financial covenants and escalating covenants; therefore, the spread
and covenants seem to be compliments rather than substitutes.
The correlation table also indicates that the number of financial covenants is higher for
borrowers or loans with the following characteristics: larger borrowers, less levered borrowers,
borrowers with better ratings, shorter loans, smaller loans, revolving loans, and loans with
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performance pricing. At the same time, performance pricing appears more often for borrowers or
loans with the following characteristics: larger borrowers, borrowers with higher ROAs,
borrowers with better ratings, longer loans, larger loans, and revolving loans.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Table 9 provides the multivariate regression of loan spread on conservatism and other
controls. Table 9 illustrates a significantly negative relation between the loan spread and the
level of borrower conservatism, which indicates that conservatism reduces the cost of debt in
general. These findings are consistent with the findings from the negative shock sample.
Additionally, Table 9 shows that tighter covenants usually accompany a higher interest rate, as
evidenced by the significantly positive relation between Numcov and Spread, and between
Escalate and Spread. This indicates that lenders use both a higher required rate of return and
tighter covenants to reduce their credit risk. Consistent with the finding from the negative shock
sample, worse debt ratings and higher leverage ratios increase the interest rate. Factors that
decrease the interest rate are high ROA, larger loan size, and longer loan maturity.
[Insert Table 9 here]
5.3.2. The relation between the cost of debt and conservatism after controlling for other earnings
attributes
Francis et al. (2004) document that each of the seven accounting attributes (quality,
persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism) is
significantly related to the cost of equity capital. However, after adding all seven attributes to the
regression, conservatism does not reduce the cost of equity capital. Their result is not surprising
because shareholders do not value accounting conservatism as much as debtholders do. I predict
that out of the seven accounting attributes, conservatism, smoothness, and persistence are
41
important to lenders in determining the cost of debt. I conjecture that lenders value conservatism
because conservative financials provide a timely signal of changes in default risk and mitigate
the downside risk of lenders. I also argue that lenders value smoothness, persistence, and
predictability of earnings for the following reasons. Persistent and/or predictable earnings series
facilitate a steady stream of future interest payments and lead to a lower default risk. Smooth
earnings series correlate with a low risk profile. I run the following regression to test the effect of
all seven earnings attributes on the cost of debt:
Spreadi = a0 + IConsvi + /32Qualityi + ,83Persistence, + /3Predictability, + /34Smoothness,
+ ,83Timeliness, -t+ 6 Relevance, + l vSize, + P8Leverage, + A 9ROA, + P3 Ratingi + ,lNumcov,
+ ,,/312Escalate, + /,1 3Otherdebt, + /JA4Loansize + J,,Loanmonth, + ,/6Revolver, + ,,, PP, +
1,aPP * Consvi + ci (3)
Earnings quality is measured as the mapping of current accruals into cash flows of the
current period, the previous period, and the next period, as in Dechow and Dichev (2002).
Specifically, I measure earnings quality as the negative standard deviation of the residuals, i.e.,
TCA , CFO CFOi,, CFOi,+l
-c(3j, ) from the regression TCAJ, = a + CFO, CFO+i
Assets °, + ',j Assets , '2, Assets, '3 Assets , t
TCA,, is firm j's total current accruals in year t. Specifically,
TCAJ, = ACA, - ACL, - ACash1 , + ASTDDEBTJ, .24 Assets, is firm j's average total assets in
year t and t-1. CFO,, is defined in footnote 14. If the standard deviation of the residuals from
this regression is high, it means that accruals do not map into cash flows very well, and the
earnings quality is low.
24 ACAJi , change in current assets (Compustat data 4). ACLj,, change in current liabilities (Compustat data 5).
ACashi,, change in cash (Compustat data 1). ASTDDEBT,, change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat
data 34).
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Earnings persistence is measured as the slope coefficient Xli from an autoregressive model
for earnings: EJ,, = , j + v,E + j,. Ej, is earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat
data 18). If the auto-coefficient from this regression is high, it means that earnings are persistent.
Earnings predictability is measured as the negative standard deviation of the residuals, i.e.,
-- (,) from the same autoregressive regression above: E, = o.j + ,jEj,,- 1 + vj,. If the
standard deviation of the residuals from this regression is high, it means that earnings are less
predictable.
Earnings smoothness is measured as the negative standard deviation of net income before
extraordinary items (Compustat data 18) divided by the standard deviation of cash flows from
operations, i.e., -- a(NIj, ) / a(CFOj,, ) . If the standard deviation of earnings is high relative to
the standard deviation of cash flows, it means that earnings are not smooth.
Earnings timeliness is measured as the adjusted R2 from the Basu's regression:
Ei, / Pi,1 = ao + rliDRi, + PoiRi + AiR, * DR, + i, . If the R2 from an earnings-returns
regression is high, it means that earnings are timely in reflecting the information in returns.
Earnings value relevance is measured as the R2 from a returns-earnings regression:
Rj, = 0oj + 24j NIj,, + A 2, ANIIj, + j,, . NIj,, is firm j's earnings before extraordinary items in
year t (Compustat data 58), scaled by price at the end of year t-1. If the R2 from the returns-
earnings regression is high, it means that earnings are value-relevant.
All seven earnings attributes are measured using all available time-series up until the loan
initiation. All measures are adjusted so that the same ordering of values across each attribute is
preserved. Also, to avoid spurious inference from the measurement error and noise, I use the
rank of each measure in the regression instead of the magnitude.
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Table 9 shows that out of the seven earnings attributes, conservatism, persistence, and
smoothness reduce the cost of debt incrementally to each other.25 This highlights the incremental
importance of accounting conservatism above and beyond the other six earnings attributes. The
evidence from this test indicates that lenders prefer a set of earnings attributes that reduce their
downside risk.
5.3.3. Market-to-book as another measure of conservatism
Market-to-book is a commonly used measure of conservatism in the accounting literature
(Beaver & Ryan, 2000; Ahmed et al., 2002; Pae et al., 2005). It originates from Felthan &
Ohlson (1995), which defines a firm to be conservative if the expected difference between
market value and book value at time t + r is greater than zero as r approaches infinity.
Mathematically, E, [,+]> 0 as r -- oo, where g, = P, -bv,. It follows naturally to measure
conservatism as the market-to-book ratio, and a market-to-book ratio larger than one indicates
conservatism.
Market-to-book captures the understatement of net assets relative to the market value, which
equals the sum of separable net assets and rents. An ideal proxy of conservatism should measure
the understatement of net assets relative to the value of separable net assets, since accounting is
not designed to record rents. In this sense, market-to-book is a noisy measure of conservatism.
More importantly, rents cannot reduce a lender's downside risk in liquidation; therefore, lenders
do not value a high level of conservatism resulting only from high rents.
Based on the above reasons, I do not use market-to-book in my main tests. However, I use
market-to-book as an additional proxy for conservatism in the robustness check, to reconcile
with the existing literature. To be consistent with the main tests, I test Hi & H2 using the rank of
2:5 Earnings' quality reduces the cost of debt in the simple correlation table (not tabulated). However, earnings
quality loses its significance in the multiple regression when all other attributes are included.
44
market-to-book as the proxy for conservatism. Market-to-book is calculated as the market value
of equity divided by the book value of equity before loan initiation (Compustat
datal 99*data25/'data60). I do not assign a predicted sign for market-to-book in all three
regressions, because the rents in the market value make market-to-book less predictive of the
covenant violation, and lenders do not value higher conservatism only resulting from the rents.
Table 10 Panel A presents the probit regression, hazard model regression, and OLS
regression to test Hla, Hlb, and H2 correspondingly. Mb_rank is not significant in the probit
regression, indicating that borrowers with higher market-to-book ratio are no more likely to
violate covenants than those with lower market-to-book. Mb_rank is marginally significant in the
hazard model regression with a negative sign, indicating that borrowers with higher market-to-
book have a lower instantaneous risk of violating covenants. Mb_rank is also marginally
significant in the spread regression with a negative sign, indicating that higher market-to-book
firms have a lower cost of debt. Other than market-to-book proxying for conservatism, an
alternative explanation is that market-to-book proxies for risk, and higher market-to-book
borrowers have lower risk, which translates into a lower interest rate.
Existing literature sometimes classifies conservatism into balance-sheet conservatism and
income-statement conservatism. 26 Balance-sheet conservatism refers to the cumulative
understatement of net assets in the balance sheet, and income-statement conservatism refers to
the asymmetric treatment of bad news and good news. While my paper does not intend to
distinguish between the two types of conservatism, my four measures especially the two
measures from B3asu (1997) capture more of the income-statement conservatism than the
26 'There is another classification of conservatism: ex-ante (or news-independent) conservatism and ex-post (or news-
dependent) conservatism. R&D expensing is one example of ex-ante conservatism, where the expensing is mandated
by GAAP and does not depend on the news arrival. Basu's asymmetric timeliness falls into the ex-post conservatism
category. One example of the ex post conservatism is writing down inventory to record the bad news associated with
the value of inventory.
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balance-sheet conservatism. It is argued that balance-sheet conservatism negatively correlates
with income-statement conservatism since the understatement of net assets in the early periods
leads to the overstatement of earnings in later periods due to the understatement of future
expenses. To address this negative correlation, I include market-to-book as a proxy for balance-
sheet conservatism to test the robustness of the results.
Table 10 Panel B shows that after including market-to-book as a control for the balance sheet
conservatism, (:oeff rank, R2 _rank, Negskewrank, Accrual rank, and Avgrank are still
significant in explaining the likelihood of covenant violation. And market-to-book does not seem
to affect covenant violation at all.
Table 10 Panel C shows that both the original four measures of conservatism and market-to-
book explain the spread. Comparing Table 6 to Table 10 Panel C, I find that including market-to-
book in the regression only reduces the significance of the original four measures slightly. It
seems that lenders reward both balance-sheet conservatism and income-statement conservatism.
[Insert Table 10 here]
.5. 3.4. Requirement of seven years of data to calculate the measures of conservatism
Increasing the time requirement on the time series reduces the noise in the measure but
reduces the sample size at the same time. I try series ranges of both five years and nine years and
the main results remain unchanged.
5.3.5. Use of initial spread as the measure of the cost of debt
In my test of H2 using the negative shock sample, the dependent variable Spread is the initial
spread of each loan, not including any fees. The all-in-drawn spread offered by SDC actually
includes all the fees associated with each loan; however, for the negative shock sample, I do not
have the all-in-drawn spread for the manually collected loans. To provide evidence on the impact
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of conservatism on a different measure of spread, I use the all-in-drawn spread from SDC to test
whether conservatism reduces the cost of debt; the results remain the same. In addition, in the
case of performance pricing loans, I use both the maximum spread and the minimum spread as
the dependent variable and find that a high level of conservatism corresponds to both a lower
maximum spread and a lower minimum spread. However, conservatism does not relate to the
performance pricing spread (maximum minus minimum) at all.
5.3.6. The intertemporal variation in the level of conservatism
To test Hi and H2 in the negative shock sample, I measure conservatism up until the loan
initiation. I also test Hi and H2 measuring conservatism up until the covenant violations and the
results remained unchanged.
To test H2 using the SDC sample, I measure conservatism as the historical level of
conservatism before the loan initiation. The use of the historical level of conservatism assumes
no change in the accounting policy after the facility is in place. If borrowers change their
accounting policy when the benefit from changing exceeds the cost of doing so, the historical
level of conservatism may understate or overstate the actual level. Assuming lenders have perfect
foresight regarding all incentives after the loan is in place, I use all available data to calculate the
measures of conservatism rather than only the earnings and returns before the loan initiation. I
compare the new measures with the historical measures and find that there are no significant
differences for all four measures of conservatism. With the new measures of conservatism
calculated using all the data available, all the results remain unchanged.
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6. Conclusions
This paper investigates the contracting benefits of accounting conservatism in the debt
contracting process. I find that the likelihood of covenant violations after negative shock(s)
increases in borrower conservatism, and more conservative borrowers violate covenants sooner. I
also find that lenders reduce the cost of debt to conservative borrowers. The more rapid violation
of covenants and lower up-front cost of debt depict an efficient contracting picture; conservatism
benefits both lenders and borrowers, and thus it likely enhances the efficiency of the debt
contracting process.
I find some evidence that performance pricing, a popular feature of recent debt contracts,
interacts with the sensitivity of the cost of debt to the level of conservatism. That is, for loans
without performance pricing, conservatism reduces the cost of debt more significantly. The
initial spreads of loans with performance pricing are already lower than those of loans without
performance pricing; since this reflects the increased flexibility in adjusting interest rates
according to changes in default risk, it is reasonable that the spreads are not further reduced by a
higher level of conservatism.
Additional tests reveal that out of seven earnings attributes (quality, persistence,
predictability, smoothness, timeliness, relevance, and conservatism), conservatism, in addition to
persistence and smoothness, incrementally reduces the cost of debt. In contrast to Francis et al.'s
(12004) finding that conservatism does not reduce the cost of equity, the evidence in my paper
shows that lenders have a different demand than shareholders regarding financial reports.
I emphasize that the debt examined in this paper is restricted to bank loans, rather than public
debt or private placements. Therefore, the results herein may not be generalizable to all forms of
debt. However, since accounting conservatism works directly through financial covenants and
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covenants are few in public debt and private placements, I believe that bank loans are the
appropriate sample to test the role of conservatism. I conclude that conservatism benefits both
lenders and borrowers when accounting numbers are used in covenants.
One potential avenue for future research is to examine the factors that determine the optimal
level of conservatism for each firm. In this paper, I document one benefit that conservatism
generates, namely, the reduction in the cost of debt. According to positive accounting theory,
conservatism is also likely to reduce both litigation costs and scrutiny from the tax authorities. At
the same time, conservatism is associated with costs. Understanding the determinants of
conservatism will help us understand the benefit-cost trade-offs that firms face in determining
their accounting policies.
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Appendix 1. Examples of the protective actions lenders take after covenant violations.
1.1. Protective actions written in the debt contract
1) Conseco Inc. 10-k Exhibit 10, 2003
"Default Interest. ... , effective immediately upon the occurrence of an Event of Default, and
for as long thereafter as such Event of Default shall be continuing, the principal balance of all
Loans and the amount of all other Obligations shall bear interest at a rate which is 2.00% per
annum in excess of the rate of interest applicable to such Loans or such other Obligations from
time to time."
2) Oriole Homes Corp. 10-k Exhibit 10, 1999
"Upon occurrence of any Event of Default, the Loan shall, at the option of Bank and without
any further notice or demand not expressly required herein, become immediately due and
payable. and shall thereafter bear interest at the Default Rate, and at all times thereafter Bank
shall have all rights, privileges, powers and remedies provided by law or equity and this
agreement, the Mortgage and any other Loan Document, and which it may otherwise have
against the Borrower, the Collateral, or otherwise."
"Default Rate means a rate of interest that is five percent (5%) per annum in excess of the
rate of interest otherwise applicable to Line Advances."
2.2. Protective actions taken by lenders after a violation of financial covenants
AEP Industries Inc. 10-k, 1998
"In October 1997. the Company received a waiver relating to certain financial ratios
contained in the Credit Agreement and entered into an amendment to the Credit Agreement (the
"Amendment"). The principle effects of the Amendment relate to the interest rate applicable to
the Credit Agreement. The interest rate margins which determine the interest rates applicable to
the loans under the Credit Agreement increased as follows: the margin applicable to Base Rate
loans (formerly 0%) increased to a range from 0% to .75% and the margin applicable to LIBOR
Rate loans (formerly .25% to .625%) increased to a range from .45% to 1.75%. "
50
Appendix 2. The disclosure requirement of debt contracts by the SEC.
Regulation S-K item 601 (b) (4): Instruments Defining the Rights of Security Holders, Including
Indentures.
(i) All instruments defining the rights of holders of the equity or debt securities being registered
including, where applicable, the relevant portion of the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the
registrant.
(ii) Except as set forth in (iii) below, for filings on Forms S-1, S-4, S-11, S-14 and F-4 under the
Securities Act and Form 10, Form 10-SB, Form 10-K and Form 1 OKSB under the Exchange Act,
all instruments defining the rights of holders of long-term debt of the registrant and its
consolidated subsidiaries and for any of its unconsolidated subsidiaries for which financial
statements are required to be filed.
(iii) Where the instrument defines the rights of holders of long-term debt of the registrant and its
consolidated subsidiaries and for any of its unconsolidated subsidiaries for which financial
statements are required to be filed, there need not be filed:
(A) any instrument with respect to long-term debt not being registered if the total amount of
securities authorized thereunder does not exceed 10 percent of the total assets of the registrant
and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis and if there is filed an agreement to furnish a copy of
:such agreement to the Commission upon request;
((B) any instrument with respect to any class of securities if appropriate steps to assure the
redemption or retirement of such class will be taken prior to or upon delivery by the registrant of
the securities being registered; or
(C) copies of instruments evidencing scrip certificates for fractions of shares.
(iv) If any of the securities being registered are, or will be, issued under an indenture to be
qualified under the Trust Indenture Act, the copy of such indenture which is filed as an exhibit
shall include or be accompanied by:
(A) a reasonably itemized and informative table of contents; and
(B) a cross-reference sheet showing the location in the indenture of the provisions inserted
pursuant to Sections 310 through 318(a) inclusive of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.
(v) With respect to Form 8-K, Form 10-Q and Form 10-QSB under the Exchange Act which are
filed and which disclose, in the text of the Form 10-Q and Form OOQSB, the interim financial
statements, or the footnotes thereto, the creation of a new class of securities or indebtedness or
the modification of existing rights of security holders, file all instruments defining the rights of
holders of these securities or indebtedness. However, there need not be filed any instrument with
respect to long-term debt not being registered which meets the exclusion set forth above in
paragraph (iii)(A).
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Appendix 3. A simple simulation to illustrate the intuition of using skewness of earnings as a
proxy for the level of conservatism.
Conservatism is defined as reporting bad news more timely than good news, as in Basu
(1997) and Watts (2003a and 2003b). In the simulation, I take this definition to an extreme: Bad
news is fully capitalized immediately into earnings and good news is disclosed gradually over
ten periods including the current period.
I assume that every period the firm receives a shock drawn from a normal (0,1) distribution.
If the shock is negative, it impacts earnings immediately. If the shock is positive, only one-tenth
of it impacts earnings this period and the rest of the shock impacts earnings evenly over the next
nine periods. This pattern continues for 100 periods. The average earnings in the 100th period
fiom 1,000 simulations looks like
A cross-sectional average of earnings of 1000 companies that report conservatively
(at t=100)
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Figure 1. Simulated distribution of earnings of 1,000 conservative firms
( T = 100, number of bins = 100, number of simulations =1,000)
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The empirical distribution of the earnings time series of one company that reports
conservatively looks similar to the distribution above if the process is ergodic (James. D.
Hamilton, "Time Series Analysis," p46-47).
A time series of the earnings of a company that reports conservatively
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Figure 2. Simulated time series of earnings of one conservative firm
(T =1,000, number of bins = 100, number of simulations = 1)
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Appendix 4. The relation between Basu's measure of conservatism and two earnings measures
of conservatism from Givoly & Hayn (2000).
To connect the skewness of earnings and negative accumulation of nonoperating accruals
with Basu's measure of conservatism, I add one more interaction term in Basu's original
regression. I define DR_skew, as a dummy variable equal to one if firm i's earnings are
negatively skewed and zero otherwise. If negatively skewed earnings reflect bad news more
quickly than good news, then I expect 2,i >0. I define DR _ accrual,, as a dummy variable equal
to one if firm i's cumulative nonoperating accrual is negative in year t and zero otherwise. If
negative cumulative nonoperating accruals is the result of earnings reflecting bad news more
quickly than good news, then I expect y2i >0. Using all the data available from Compustat and
CRSP, I obtain the following results.
E,, / PI,,_ = a0o, + alDR,, + fo, R,t + l3iR, E,, i Pit-,, = ca0i + aDR,, + yoi R,, + 1,Rt
* DR,, + ,2i R,, * DR,, * DR _ skew, + e,, * DR, + 2i Ri, * DR,, * DR _ accrual, + a,,
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient
(expected sign) estimates (expected sign) estimates
Intercept 0.07 Intercept 0.06
(98.5)*** (101.4)***
DR -0.007 DR -0.005
(-5.4)*** (-3.9)***
R -0.007 R -0.02
(-5.8)*** (-15.8)***
R*DR (+) 0.14 R*DR (+) 0.26
(28.7)*** (52.2)***
R*DR*DR_skew (+) 0.14 R*DR*DR_accrual (+) 0.03
(31.4)*** (6.1)***
R2' 11.8% R 2 13.2%
f,,
Rin
L)Ri,
DR _ skew,
DR _ accrual,,
EPS for firm i in fiscal year t.
Price per share at the beginning of the fiscal year.
Annual return on firm i ending three months after fiscal year-end t.
Dummy variable equal to one if R,, <0 and zero otherwise.
Dummy variable equal to one if firm i's earnings are negatively skewed and
zero otherwise.
Dummy variable equal to one if firm i's nonoperating accrual is negative in
year t and zero otherwise.
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Table 1. Sample selection of the negative shock sample
I form the negative shock sample to test the covenant violation hypothesis (Hla & b)) and the
cost of debt hypothesis (H2). The requirement on the negative shock(s) increases the power of
the test. The exclusion of low debt firms reduces the possibility that the sample firm has no
covenants to violate. To calculate firm-specific measures of conservatism, I need enough time-
series data of earnings and returns. Finally, I need original debt contracts to control for the loan
characteristics in the covenant violation test.
Selection criteria Number of firms left in the sample
Firms with at least one monthly return less than - 4,339
30% during year 1999 or 2000
Exclude firms with long-term debt less than 10% 1,786
of total assets
Exclude firms without seven years of earnings and 515
return data to calculate the measures of
conservatism
Exclude firms without original debt contracts to 327
calculate the tightness of covenants
Exclude firms without initial spread to test H2 314
Among the 327 firms in the negative shock sample, 98 firms disclose the violation of covenants afterwards in their
10K, 10Q or 8K filings. Test of Hla is based on these 327 firms for Consv_coeff, Consv_negskew, and
Consv_accrual. Test of Hla for Consv_R2 is based on 309 firms with at least three positive annual returns and at
least three negative annual returns.
Test of Hlb is based on 279 firms whose covenant violation dates can be identified. To test Hlb using Consv_R2,
13 firmnns are excluded due to less than three positive or negative annual returns.
Test of H2 is based on these 314 firms for Consv_coeff, Consv_negskew, and Consv_accrual. Test of H2 for
Consv_R 2 is based on 297 firms with at least three positive annual returns and at least three negative annual returns.
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Table 2. Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent variables
Violate
Num_quarter
Spread
Treatment variables
Consvcoeff
Consv R2
Consv_negskew
Consv accrual
Consv_avgrank
Control variables -
Cumret
Size
Leverage
ROA
A,\NW
ALev
Rating
Control variables -
Numcov
Escalate
Other debt
Loan size
Loan month
Month to maturity
Dichotomous variable equal to one if the sample firm violated its
covenants after the negative shock and zero otherwise.
Number of quarters between the negative shock and the first covenant
violation if the firm violates its covenants, number of quarters between
the negative shock and May 31, 2003 or loan maturity, whichever is
shorter, if the firm does not violate its covenants
The initial spread (basis points over LIBOR) charged for each loan
0 iP"1 i from firm-specific earnings-returns regression
,60 
1I, I P,_ = a0 i + liDR + OiRj + pl1 Ri, * DR,l + ,j (Basu, 1997). It measures the
relative sensitivity of earnings to bad news compared to good news
R2bad / R2good where R2 bad (R2 good) comes from the same Basu's regression
above but applied only to the negative (positive) return period
- (skewness of earnings / skewness of cash flow from operations)
- (accumulated nonoperating accruals / accumulated total assets)
Average rank of the four measures of conservatism above
borrower characteristics
The size of the negative shock(s) firms experienced during 1999 and
2000. If a firm has multiple monthly returns less than -30%, cumret
equals the buy-and-hold return for those months.
The natural log of the total assets of the borrower (log(data6))
Long term debt / total assets (data9/data6)
Net income / total assets (datal 72/data6)
Change in net worth (data60) from loan initiation to the negative shock,
deflated by the net worth prior to loan initiation
Change in leverage (data9/data6) from loan initiation to the negative
shock, deflated by the leverage prior to loan initiation
Actual S&P debt rating if available; imputed debt rating when actual
rating is not available
loan characteristics
Number of financial covenants contained in the debt contract
Dichotomous variable equal to one if any of the financial covenant is
escalating and zero otherwise
Dichotomous variable equal to one if the same borrower has other loans
and zero otherwise
Principal / total assets of the borrower
Length of the loan in months
Number of months from the negative shock to the maturity of the loan
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I
Dichotomous variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing
and zero otherwise
Dichotomous variable equal to one for revolving loans and zero otherwiseRevolver
Other earnings attributes
Quality
Persistence
Predictability
Smoothness
Timeliness
Value relevance
- (ij,) from the regression
TCAjI CO, CFO j CFOj +1
Assel aOj + al,j Assets1 + 2,j Assetsj, + 3,j Assets j v 
The slope coefficient ,j from the regression Ej,, = 00,j + ,jEj,1-l + 'jt
- c(vj,) from the regression kj,, = 00,j + l,j Ej,t- + j,t
- c(N1j,,)/(Ci ),, ) where NI is net income before extraordinary items
R2 from the regression E,, IPj_ = aoi + ali DRil + Rt + R * DRij + ij
R2 from the regression Rj 1, = Aoj + Al NlI,t + A2,/ + jI
60
PP
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for the negative shock sample. The negative shock sample is comprised of
firms that a) experienced at least one negative monthly return less than -30% during year 1999 and 2000; b) have
enough earnings and return data to calculate the measures of accounting conservatism; c) have original loan
contracts available. The sample size is 339 firms among which 102 firms violate their covenants after the shock.
Negative shock sample
Variable
ConsvCoeff
ConsvR 2
Consv_negskew
Consv accrual
Cumret
Numcov
Size
ROA
Leverage
~XNW
.ALev
Loan size
L,oan month
Rating
Monthtomaturity
Num_quarter
Spread
N
327
309
327
327
327
327
327
327
327
327
327
327
327
327
327
71
314
Mean
1.30
8.01
0.42
-0.002
-0.54
2.83
5.82
-0.04
0.33
0.17
0.85
0.25
48.2
12.73
25.51
5.48
172.2
Q1
-1.52
0.21
-0.5
-0.02
-0.71
2
4.47
-0.04
0.17
-0.08
0.00
0.08
36
10
11
3
95
Median
0.62
0.92
-0.6
-0.01
-0.48
3
5.85
0.02
0.27
0.00
0.14
0.17
48
12
23
5
150
Q3
3.24
4.56
1.4
0.00
-0.36
3
6.95
0.05
0.42
0.40
0.95
0.33
60
14
37
7
250
Std.
13.68
22.9
1.4
0.06
0.21
1.15
1.75
0.25
0.22
2.72
1.65
0.31
20.9
4.03
18.53
4.8
107
ConsvCoeff
Consv R2
Consv_negskew
Consvaccrual
C'umret
Numcov
Size
ROA
Leverage
ZNW
ALev
Loan size
Loan month
Rating
Monthto_maturity
Numquarter
Spread
'°i+ li from firm-specific earnings-returns regression
hoi
Ei, / P-_ = ai li +t + oiRi + iRi, * DRi, + it (Basu, 1997).
R2 bad/ R2 good where R2 bad (R2 good) comes from the same Basu's regression above but applied
only to the negative (positive) return period.
- (skewness of earnings / skewness of cash flow from operations)
- (accumulated nonoperating accruals / accumulated total assets)
The size of the negative shock(s) firms experienced during 1999 and 2000. If a firm has
multiple monthly returns less than -30%, cumret equals the buy-and-hold return for those
months.
Number of financial covenants contained in the debt contract
The natural log of the total assets of the borrower (log(data6))
Net income / total assets (data172/data6)
Long term debt / total assets (data9/data6)
Change in net worth (data60) from loan initiation to the negative shock, deflated by the net
worth prior to loan initiation
Change in leverage (data9/data6) from loan initiation to the negative shock, deflated by the
leverage ratio prior to loan initiation
Principal / total assets of the borrower
Length of the loan in months
Actual S&P debt rating if available; imputed debt rating when actual rating is not available.
Number of months from the negative shock to the maturity of the loan
Number of quarters between the negative shock and the first covenant violation
The initial spread (basis points over LIBOR) charged for each loan
Consv coeff, Consv R2 , Consv_accrual are truncated at top and bottom one percentile in both samples to exclude
the influence of outliers from estimation. The results are robust including or excluding the outliers.
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Panel B. Industry composition of the negative shock sample
Industry
Mining
Food, Beverage, Tobacco
Textile, Wood, Furniture, Paper, Printing and Publishing
Chemicals and Allied Products, Plastic Material
Medicinal Chemicals, Pharmaceutical Preparations
Oil and Gas Extractions, Petroleum Refining and Related
Plastic, Leather, Glass, Concrete Products, Metal,
Fabricated Metal Products
Computers, Electronics, Computer Services
Transportation, Communication
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services
Wholesale and Retail
Services
Banks, Financial Institutions, Real Estate
Total
Number of firms
3
3
25
7
16
11
97
52
8
4
60
28
13
327
Percentage
0.92%
0.92%
7.65%
2.14%
4.89%
3.36%
29.66%
15.90%
2.45%
1.22%
18.35%
8.56%
3.98%
100.00%
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Table 4. Probit regression of the likelihood of covenant violations on the level of conservatism
Violatei = a0 + aoConsvi + /,Cumreti + f2 Sizei + ,3 Leverage, + f,4ROAj + flsNW + ,l6ALevi
+ 7, Ratingi + ,8lNumcovj + /3Escalatei + ,,OOtherdebt + ,3 1Loansizej + ,,2Month_ to_ maturityj + c,. (la)
Variables Expected Coeff R2 Negskew Accrual Avgrank
sign rank rank rank rank
Intercept
Consv
Firm-specific control variables
Cumretrank
Size
Leverage ?
ROA
ANW
,ALev
Rating
+
±
+
Loan-specific control variables
Numcov
Escalate
Other debt
+
+
+
Loan size
Monthto
_.maturity
N
Pseudo R 2
Percent
(Correctly
Predicted
+
-0.33
(1.57)
0.001
(2.00)
-0.001
(2.04)
-0.17
(5.45)**
-0.24
(1. 19)
0.63
(1.06)
0.01
(0.08)
-0.24
(1.19)
0.03
(0.31)
-0.11
(1.93)
0.002
(3.46)*
-0.001
(2.08)
-0.22
(6.87)**
-0.26
(0.45)
0.66
(0.91)
0.02
(0.15)
-0.02
(0.28)
0.01
(0.07)
-0.37
(1.53)
0.002
(3.95)*
-0.001
(2.11)
-0.17
(5.61)**
-0.26
(1.35)
0.64
(1.04)
0.01
(0.07)
-0.02
(0.22)
0.02
(0.19)
0.23
(2.41)
0.003
(4.68)**
-0.002
(5.04)**
-0.20
(5.28)**
-0.33
(1.91)
0.69
(0.94)
0.02
(0.19)
0.03
(0.33)
0.01
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.00)
0.004
(4.28)**
-0.002
(4.97)**
-0.19
(5.22)**
-0.33
(1.73)
0.68
(0.90)
0.02
(0.18)
0.02
(0.09)
0.02
(0.16)
0.12
(2.66)*
-0.10
(0.35)
0.20
(1.67)
-0.14
(3.56)*
-0.01
(0.11)
327
7.4%
67.7
0.12
(2.64)*
-0.15
(0.69)
0.24
(1.96)
-0.16
(3.71)*
-0.01
(0.24)
309
8.5%
68.4
0.14
(3.62)*
-0.17
(0.99)
0.20
(1.57)
-0.14
(3.50)*
-0.01
(0.31)
327
8.0%
68.3
0.08
(1.13)
-0.06
(0.10)
0.28
(2.39)
-0.14
(2.78)*
-0.01
(2.19)
327
11.7%
71.3
0.08
(0.99)
-0.05
(0.06)
0.31
(2.79)*
-0.17
(4.08)*
-0.01
(1.92)
309
12.2%
72.8
64
ConsvCoeff, P°i+Pli from firm-specific earnings-returns regression E, I Pj_t = a0i DR +lDR +fo iRi 
* DRi + ij, (Basu, 1997). Consv_R 2, R2bad/ R2good where R2 bad (R2good) comes from the same Basu's regression above
but applied only to the negative (positive) return period. Consv_negskew, - (skewness of earnings / skewness of
cash flow from operations). Consv_accrual, - (accumulated nonoperating accruals / accumulated total assets).
Consv_avgrank, average rank of the four measures of conservatism above. Cumret, The size of the negative
shock(s) firms experienced during 1999 and 2000. If a firm has multiple monthly returns less than -30%, cumret
equals the buy-and-hold return for those months. Size, the natural log of the total assets of the borrower (log(data6)).
Leverage, long term debt / total assets (data9/data6). ROA, net income / total assets (data 172/data6). ANW, Change
in net worth (data60) from loan initiation to the negative shock, deflated by the net worth prior to loan initiation.
ALev, Change in leverage (data9/data6) from loan initiation to the negative shock, deflated by the leverage ratio
prior to loan initiation. Rating, actual S&P debt rating if available; imputed debt rating when actual rating is not
available. Numcov., number of financial covenants contained in the debt contract. Escalate, dichotomous variable
equal to one if any of the financial covenant is escalating and zero otherwise. Other debt, dichotomous variable
equal to one if the same borrower has other loans. Loan size, principal / total assets of the borrower. Loan month,
length of the loan in months.
Chi-Square statistics are presented in the parentheses.
** and * represent significance at 1 percent and 5 percent level for one-tailed or two-tailed tests as appropriate.
Pseudo R = [log likelihood (intercept only) - log likelihood (intercept and covariate)] / log likelihood (intercept and
covariate)
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Table 5. Hazard model regression of the instantaneous risk of covenant violations on the level of
conservatism and other covariates.
In hi (t) = a(t)+a,Consv, + /, Cumreti + ,2 Sizei + fl3Leveragei + ,4 ROA, + ,35 ANWj + ,/6ALevi
+ ,8Rating, + ,8 Numcovj +,/9 Escalatei + ,,Otherdebt, + ,, Loansize + ,2Month_to_maturity + . (b)
Variable Expected Coeff R2 Negskew Accrual Avgrank
sign rank rank rank rank
Consv + 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.53) (0.52) (2.12) (2.56)* (1.64)
Firm-specific control variables
Cumret rank
Size
Leverage ?
ROA
ANW
ALev
Rating
+
+
Loan-specific control variables
Numcov
IE sclate
Other debt
+
+
+
]Loan size
Monthto
__maturity
N
Pseudo R2
+
-0.001
(0.18)
-0.33
(5.18)**
-0.22
(0.22)
0.65
(0.35)
0.01
(0.07)
-0.02
(0.08)
0.002
(0.01)
-0.001
(0.04)
-0.42
(6.14)**
-0.21
(0.18)
0.72
(0.32)
0.03
(0.11)
-0.03
(0.17)
0.05
(0.19)
-0.001
(0.13)
-0.33
(5.14)**
-0.22
(0.21)
0.72
(0.42)
0.01
(0.07)
-0.02
(0.10)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.002
(1.94)
-0.30
(3.70)*
-0.50
(0.86)
1.09
(0.74)
0.03
(0.12)
0.03
(0.10)
0.03
(0.05)
-0.002
(1.78)
-0.30
(3.60)*
-0.57
(1.06)
0.85
(0.48)
0.03
(0.11)
0.02
(0.06)
0.03
(0.07)
0.15
(1.50)
0.02
(0.003)
0.23
(0.66)
-0.13
(0.99)
-0.01
(0.35)
0.17
(1.89)
0.09
(0.08)
0.29
(0.90)
-0.15
(1.20)
-0.01
(0.33)
266
3.7%
0.17
(1.95)
-0.07
(0.05)
0.23
(0.66)
-0.12
(0.77)
-0.01
(0.45)
279
3.3%
0.61
(0.20)
0.28
(0.65)
0.20
(0.41)
-0.16
(1.22)
-0.01
(1.00)
279
4.7%
0.02
(0.02)
0.32
(0.81)
0.27
(0.72)
-0.18
(1.49)
-0.01
(0.84)
266
4.7%
279
3.0%
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Consv Coeff ili from firm-specific earnings-returns regression E/ P,_l = a0i + It ,DR, Pi0 R + jt ljRj
o0i
* DRi + t (Basu, 1997). Consv_R 2, R2 bad/ R2 good where R2 bad (R2good) comes from the same Basu's regression above
but applied only to the negative (positive) return period. Consv_negskew, - (skewness of earnings / skewness of
cash flow from operations). Consv_accrual, - (accumulated nonoperating accruals / accumulated total assets).
Consv_avgrank, average rank of the four measures of conservatism above. Cumret, The size of the negative
shock(s) firms experienced during 1999 and 2000. If a firm has multiple monthly returns less than -30%, cumret
equals the buy-and-hold return for those months. Size, the natural log of the total assets of the borrower (log(data6)).
Leverage, long term debt / total assets (data9/data6). ROA, net income / total assets (data I 72/data6). ANW, Change
in net worth (data60) from loan initiation to the negative shock, deflated by the net worth prior to loan initiation.
ALev, Change in leverage (data9/data6) from loan initiation to the negative shock, deflated by the leverage ratio
prior to loan initiation. Rating, actual S&P debt rating if available; imputed debt rating when actual rating is not
available. Numcov., number of financial covenants contained in the debt contract. Escalate, dichotomous variable
equal to one if any of the financial covenant is escalating and zero otherwise. Other debt, dichotomous variable
equal to one if the same borrower has other loans. Loan size, principal / total assets of the borrower. Loan month,
length of the loan in months.
Chi-Square statistics are presented in the parentheses.
** and * represent significance at 1 percent and 5 percent level for one-tailed or two-tailed tests as appropriate.
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Table 6. OLS Regression of the loan spread on the level of conservatism of the firm.
Spread = a0 + , Consv, + ,l2Size, + ,83Leverage, + ,84ROA, + ,5Ratingi + ,6Numcov, + ,87Escalate,+ ,80Otherdebt,  JLoansize,  ,,Loanmonth,  /,,Revolver,  ,8,2PPj  /,83PP * Consv  , (2)
Variables Expected Coeff R2 Negskew Accrual Avgrank
sign rank rank rank rank
Intercept 66.58
(0.84)
-0.32
(-1.98)*
Consv
Firm-specific control variables
Size
Leverage +
ROA
S&P rating
Loan-specific control
Numcov
Escalate
Other debt
L[,oan size
ILoan month
Revolver
PP
P'P*Consv
N
Adj R 2
+
1.24
(0.22)
34.57
(1.25)
-20.39
(-0.35)
16.90
(4.27)**
17.53
(0.16)
-0.23
(-2.15)*
1.56
(0.25)
41.35
(2.15)*
-13.72
(-0.22)
17.25
(4.10)**
70.88
(0.92)
-0.40
(-2.84)**
0.55
(0.10)
41.98
(1.53)
-35.15
(-0.61)
17.59
(4.52)**
46.35
(0.55)
-0.41
(-2.07)*
5.12
(0.83)
44.73
(1.50)
-29.50
(-0.47)
17.70
(4.25)**
95.63
(1.08)
-0.86
(-2.75)**
5.44
(0.88)
43.22
(1.45)
-23.73
(-0.36)
17.84
(4.27)**
variables
9 2.17
(0.43)
35.17
(2.97)**
-11.33
(-0.98)
-23.90
(-1.21)
-0.25
(-0.82)
-55.07
(-2.69)**
-104.07
(-4.10)**
0.40
(2.12)*
314
43.3%
-1.91
(-0.34)
38.20
(2.94)**
-4.99
(-0.90)
-27.72
(-1.35)
-0.33
(-0.99)
-42.19
(-2.28)**
-56.40
(-2.20)*
-0.03
(-0.06)
297
41.6%
2.40
(0.48)
35.39
(3.00)**
-13.13
(-1.14)
-26.03
(-1.33)
-0.32
(-1.04)
-49.40
(-2.47)* 
-93.43
(-3.70)**
0.29
(1.67)
314
44.4%
-1.52
(-0.27)
32.08
(2.43)*
-4.71
(-0.37)
-4.39
(-0.16)
-0.36
(-1.09)
-53.10
(-2.53)**
-108.24
(-3.92)**
0.39
(1.67)
314
43.0%
-0.34
(-0.06)
33.05
(2.45)**
-3.07
(-0.24)
-7.27
(-0.27)
-0.43
(-1.27)
-55.70
(-2.64)* *
-161.21
(-3.56)**
0.85
(2.22)*
297
43.2%
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Spread, the initial spread (basis points over LIBOR) charged for each loan. Consv Coeff, °i +Pi from firm-
/3oi
specific earnings-returns regression E, /I P,_ = aoi + aijDRj + oiRi + liR*DR,,+Eeit (Basu, 1997). Consv_R2 , R2 bad/
R2good where R2 bad (R2good) comes from the same Basu's regression above but applied only to the negative (positive)
return period. Consv_negskew, - (skewness of earnings / skewness of cash flow from operations). Consv_accrual, -
(accumulated nonoperating accruals / accumulated total assets). Consv_avgrank, average rank of the four measures
of conservatism above. Size, the natural log of the total assets of the borrower (log(data6)). Leverage, long term
debt / total assets (data9/data6). ROA, net income / total assets (data172/data6). Rating, actual S&P debt rating if
available; imputed debt rating when actual rating is not available. Numcov, number of financial covenants contained
in the debt contract. Escalate, dichotomous variable equal to one if any of the financial covenant is escalating and
zero otherwise. Other debt, dichotomous variable equal to one if the same borrower has other loans. Loan size,
principal / total assets of the borrower. Loan month, length of the loan in months. Revolver, dichotomous variable
equal to one for revolving loans and zero otherwise. PP, dichotomous variable equal to one if the loan has
performance pricing and zero otherwise.
** and * represent significance at 1 percent and 5 percent level for one-tailed or two-tailed tests as appropriate.
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Table 7 Sample selection of the SDC large sample
I form the SDC sample to provide out-of-sample robustness check to the cost of debt hypothesis
(H2). Notice that SDC has comprehensive coverage on loan issues but not necessarily on
covenants. Therefore, issues without covenants may actually have covenants not covered by
SDC. Caution must be exerted when interpreting the numbers below.
Selection criteria Total issues
(number of borrowers)
Syndicated loans from SDC (1994-2003) 72,067 (28,446)
Issues with covenants 13,227 (5,066)
Issues with financial covenants 8,055 (4,798)*
Issues with initial spread over LIBOR 6,279 (3,915)
Availability of Compustat data 3,992 (2,327)
Requirement of enough earnings and returns data to calculate 1,974 (1,156)
measures of conservatism and other earnings attributes
* See figure 2 for the frequency distribution of the financial covenants. Debt-related, net worth and interest coverage
are the most frequently used financial covenants. Among 12,587 issues with financial covenants 6,113 issues (2,746
borrowers) have net worth covenant.
**
The table below shows the frequency of issues of individual borrowers.
Number of issue on Number of borrowers Total issues
SDC over 1994-2003 correspondingly
1 667 667
2 284 568
3 138 414
4 36 144
5 16 80
6 9 54
7 4 28
8 1 8
11 1 11
Total issues 1156 1974
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics of the SDC large sample
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of SDC sample
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std.
Spread 143.10 60 125 200 102.83
Consv coeff 1.20 -1.24 0.88 2.83 15.11
Consv R2 8.92 0.38 1.33 5.54 23.02
Consv_negskew 1.41 -0.57 0.26 1.48 14.50
Consv accrual 0.0004 0.001 0.008 0.02 0.14
Quality 1.23 0.95 1.05 1.27 0.68
Persistence 0.61 0.33 0.65 0.95 0.44
Predictability -38.34 -39.23 -15.19 -6.44 58.01
Smoothness -0.14 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 1.92
Timliness 0.38 0.16 0.32 0.57 0.27
Relevance 0.33 0.12 0.27 0.48 0.25
Size 6.87 5.78 6.78 7.84 1.53
Leverage 0.26 0.12 0.25 0.38 0.19
ROA 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10
Rating 10.26 9 10 12 2.57
Loan size 0.26 0.11 0.20 0.35 0.20
Loan month 41.23 24 37 60 21.63
-Numcov 2.81 2 3 4 1.20
Escalate 0.46 0 0 1 0.50
Otherdebt 0.78 1 1 1 0.41
Revolver 0.86 1 1 1 0.35
IP 0.79 1 1 1 0.41
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Panel B. Industry composition of the SDC sample
Industry
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Mining, Oil & Gas
Food, Beverage, Tobacco
Textile, Wood, Furniture, Paper, Printing and Publishing
Chemicals and Allied Products, Plastic Material
Medicinal Chemicals, Pharmaceutical Preparations
Oil and Gas Extractions, Petroleum Refining and Related
Plastic, Leather, Glass, Concrete Products, Metal,
Fabricated Metal Products
Computers, Electronics, Computer Services
Transportation, Communication
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services
Wholesale and Retail
Services
Banks, Financial Institutions, Real Estate
Total
Number of firms
4
60
44
206
56
19
118
467
136
88
99
307
186
184
1,974
Percentage
0.20%
3.04%
2.23%
10.44%
2.84%
0.96%
5.98%
23.66%
6.89%
4.46%
5.02%
15.55%
9.42%
9.32%
100%
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Table 9. Large sample evidence on the association between the initial loan spread and
conservatism after controlling for the borrowers' other accounting attributes (N=1,974).27
Variables
Intercept
Expected
sign
Earnings attributes
Consv
Quality
Persistence
Predictability
Smoothness
Timeliness
Relevance ?
Firm-specific control variables
Size
Leverage +
ROA
S&P rating +
Loan-specific control variables
Numcov ?
E scalate ?
Other debt ?
Loan size ?
Loan month
Revolver
PP ?
PP*Consv ?
Industry dummies
Ad R2
27 1 exclude firms with less than three positive or negative returns to
Consv R2 measure.
calculate ConsvR 2, therefore, N=1,679 for
Coeff
rank
17.52
(0.62)
-0.009
(-3.76)* *
0.002
(0.83)
-0.01
(-3.77)* 
0.01
(2.68)**
-0.01
(-3.14)**
0.007
(2.24)*
-0.002
(-0.55)
-5.37
(-2.07)*
26.14
(2.46)**
-31.15
(-1.60)
13.0
(12.0)**
7.61
(4.34)**
43.76
(10.85)**
0.02
(0.01)
-15.42
(-2.77)**
-0.51
(-5.94)**
-66.84
(-1 1.91)**
-1.5
(-0.20)
-0.02
(-2.40)*
Included
47.3%
rank
34.47
(1.22)
-0.006
(-2.41)* 
0.01
(2.12)*
-0.005
(-3.02)**
0.01
(-0.89)
-0.01
(-4.00)* 
0.01
(1.95)*
0.005
(0.74)
-8.3
(-3.20)**
36.2
(3.69)**
-35.44
(-1.30)
11.98
(9.09)**
7.18
(3.12)**
45.28
(8.71)**
0.6
(0.87)
-14.1
(-2.82)**
-0.4
(-5.25)**
-69.8
(-11.14)**
-21.5
(-2.96)**
-0.02
(-1.41)
Included
45.9%
Negskew
_rank
26.44
(0.94)
-0.005
(-1.95)*
0.003
(1.09)
-0.009
(-3.11)**
0.01
(2.50)*
-0.01
(-3.28)* 
0.006
(1.98)*
0.0004
(0.10)
-4.95
(-1.91)*
29.29
(2.74)**
-27.48
(-1.40)
12.91
(11.80)**
7.55
(4.28)**
43.52
(10.75)**
-0.23
(-0.06)
-15.63
(-2.80)**
-0.51
(-5.90)* 
-67.06
(-11.92)**
-10.33
(-1.19)
-0.01
(-1.26)
Included
47.0%
Accrual
rank
39.30
(1.39)
-0.008
(-2.47)* *
0.002
(0.84)
-0.009
(-3.44)**
0.01
(2.56)**
-0.01
(-3.31)**
0.007
(2.17)*
-0.0001
(-0.06)
-5.13
(-1.98)*
28.25
(2.65)**
-29.85
(-1.53)
12.93
(12.17)**
7.66
(4.35)**
43.77
(10.83)**
0.19
(0.05)
-15.08
(-2.70)**
-0.50
(-5.76)**
-67.09
(-11.93)**
-20.90
(-2.56)**
0.001
(0.26)
Included
47.2%
Avgrank
28.50
(1.00)
-0.006
(-4.37)**
0.01
(2.10)*
-0.009
(-3.12)**
0.01
(2.79)**
-0.01
(-3.13)**
0.006
(2.06)*
-0.001
(-0.44)
-6.55
(-2.45)* 
30.66
(2.80)**
-26.89
(-1.37)
12.83
(1 1.91)**
6.99
(3.85)**
43.03
(10.45)**
0.09
(0.02)
-14.44
(-2.55)**
-0.53
(-6.06)**
-69.47
(-12.12)**
-11.33
(-1.35)
-0.01
(-1.12)
Included
47.4%
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Spread, The initial spread (basis points over LIBOR) charged for each loan. Consv_Coeff, P°i+l li from firm-
P0oi
specific earnings-returns regression Ejt, Pit- = + ai DRi+ ' 0lRi +lRj * DR +i +   + (Basu, 1997). Consv_R2,
R2bad / R2good where R2 bad (R2good) comes from the same Basu's regression above but applied only to the negative
(positive) return period. Consv_negskew, - (skewness of earnings / skewness of cash flow from operations).
Consv_accrual, - (accumulated nonoperating accruals / accumulated total assets). Consv_avgrank, average rank of
the four measures of conservatism above.
TCAjt CFO 1 1 CFO ,'t (%'Oj1Quality, - (:it ) from the regression Assetst aO0 j + 1 Assetsit + a2 Assets + a3,j se, + ' J . Persistence,
The slope coefficient ~,j from the regression E j t = O j + 1 jEj 1E,_l +vj, . Predictability, - r(oit) from the
regression E i, = o,0j + 41,iEi,_-1 + j,t · Smoothness, - a(Nlj, )ia(c'FOj,) where NI is net income before extraordinary
items. Timeliness, R2 from the regression E / Pi,_t- = aOi + aliDRi + oiRi + liRi, * DRit + j, . Value relevance,
.j2 from the regression R = A0i j + jNIj, + 2,jANIl, + j, . Size, the natural log of the total assets of the
borrower (log(data6)). Leverage, net income / total assets (data172/data6). ROA, long term debt / total assets
(data9/data6). Rating, actual S&P debt rating if available; imputed debt rating when actual rating is not available.
Numcov, number of financial covenants contained in the debt contract. Escalate, dichotomous variable equal to one
if any of the financial covenant is escalating and zero otherwise. Other debt, dichotomous variable equal to one if
the same borrower has other loans. Loan size, principal / total assets of the borrower. Loan month, length of the
loan in months. Revolver, dichotomous variable equal to one for revolving loans and zero otherwise. PP,
dichotomous variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing and zero otherwise.
·* and * represent significance at 1 percent and 5 percent level for one-tailed or two-tailed tests as appropriate.
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Table 10 Market-to-book as another measure of conservatism
Panel A. Test H a & b and H2 using the market-to-book as a measure of conservatism
'Variables
(expected sign)
Intercept
Mb_rank (?)
Cumret_rank (-)
Size (-)
Leverage (?)
ROA (-)
,ANW (-)
ALev (+)
Rating (+)
Numcov (+)
Escalate (+)
Other debt (+)
Loan size (?)
Month to
maturity (?)
N
Pseudo R2
Test of Hla with
Violat as
dependent variable
0.04
(0.00)
-0.001
(0.60)
-0.001
(2.91)*
-0.17
(5.14)**
-0.24
(1.17)
0.58
(0.91)
0.01
(0.07)
-0.01
(0.10)
0.03
(0.26)
0.12
(2.85)*
-0.12
(0.53)
0.19
(1.48)
-0.14
(3.45)*
-0.002
(0.19)
327
7.3%
Test of Hlb with
ln(T) as dependent
variable
N/A
-0.002
(2.15)
-0.001
(0.71)
-0.31
(4.60)**
-0.25
(0.27)
0.63
(0.33)
0.01
(0.06)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.004
(0.002)
0.16
(1.74)
-0.04
(0.02)
0.20
(0.53)
-0.16
(1.49)
-0.004
(0.34)
279
3.2%
Variables
(expected
sign)
Intercept
Mb_rank (?)
Size (-)
Leverage (+)
ROA (-)
S&P rating
(+)
Numcov (?)
Escalate (?)
Other debt (?)
Loan size (?)
Loan month
(-)
Revolver (-)
PP (-)
PP*Consv (?)
N
Adj_R 2
Test of H2
with spread
as dependent
variable
49.81
(0.63)
-0.22
(-1.56)
1.76
(0.31)
33.92
(1.23)
1.77
(0.03)
17.43
(4.43)**
-1.02
(-0.20)
34.70
(2.92)**
-8.50
(-0.73)
-27.26
(-1.38)
-0.28
(-0.90)
-45.20
(-2.37)**
-65.91
(-2.83)* *
0.08
(0.47)
314
43.2%
Mb_rank, the rank of market-to-book ratio (Compustat datal99*data25/data60) before loan
initiation. Other variables are defined the same as before.
* * and * represent significance at 1 percent and 5 percent level for one-tailed or two-tailed tests as appropriate.
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Panel B. Test of H a using market-to-book as a control
addition to four main measures of conservatism.
for balance-sheet conservatism in
Variables Expected Coeff R2 Negskew Accrual Avgrank
sign rank rank rank rank
Intercept
Consv +
-0.25
(1.66)
0.001
(1.88)
Market-to-book as an additional control
Mbrank ? -0.001
(0.60)
-0.09
(0.01)
0.002
(2.84)*
-0.001
(0.96)
-0.26
(0.07)
0.002
(3.69)*
-0.001
(0.81)
-0.11
(0.01)
0.003
(4.88)**
-0.001
(0.53)
-0.32
(0.08)
0.004
(4.90)**
-0.001
(0.67)
Other control variables
Cumretrank
Size
Leverage ?
ROA
,ANW
,!\Lev
Rating
Numcov
Escalate
Other debt
+
+
+
+
+
Loan size
Month to
_maturity
N
Pseudo R2
Percent
Correctly
Predicted
-0.001
(2.04)*
-0.16
(4.89)**
-0.24
(1. 18)
0.57
(0.87)
0.02
(0.15)
-0.02
(0.20)
0.03
(0.31)
0.11
(2.58)*
-0.11
(0.40)
0.21
(1.80)
-0.15
(3.83)*
-0.01
(0.19)
327
7.6%
67.7
-0.001
(1.60)
-0.19
(5.53)**
-0.26
(0.89)
0.58
(0.78)
0.03
(0.29)
0.03
(0.13)
0.03
(0.24)
0.11
(2.09)
-0.14
(0.63)
0.23
(1.99)
-0.18
(5.11)**
-0.01
(0.96)
309
8.5%
68.5
-0.001
(0.96)
-0.16
(4.78)**
-0.34
(1.68)
0.61
(0.91)
0.01
(0.07)
0.04
(0.24)
0.02
(0.18)
0.13
(3.49)*
-0.17
(1.08)
0.21
(1.66)
-0.15
(3.77) *
-0.01
(0.56)
327
8.2%
68.4
-0.002
(6.29)**
-0.14
(2.79)*
-0.48
(2.80)
0.97
(1.76)
0.03
(0.34)
0.07
(0.62)
0.04
(0.46)
0.08
(1.10)
-0.07
(0.15)
0.29
(2.51)*
-0.15
(3.26)*
-0.01
(2.14)
327
12.3%
72.1
-0.002
(5.75)**
-0.16
(3.47)*
-0.47
(2.61)
0.84
(1.32)
0.03
(0.29)
0.04
(0.18)
0.04
(0.45)
0.08
(1.05)
-0.07
(0.13)
0.32
(3.05)*
-0.19
(4.58)**
-0.01
(1.91)
309
13.3%
73.8
** and * represent significance at 1 percent and 5 percent level for one-tailed or two-tailed tests as appropriate.
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Panel C. Test of H2 using market-to-book as a control for balance-sheet conservatism in addition
to four main measures of conservatism.
Variables Expected Coeff R2 Negskew Accrual Avgrank
sign rank rank rank rank
Intercept 77.82
(0.98)
-0.27
(-1.69)*
Consv
42.38
(0.52)
-0.21
(-2.00)*
90.98
(1.18)
-0.39
(-2.74)**
61.69
(0.74)
-0.36
(-1.85)
112.18
(1.28)
-0.82
(-2.68)**
Market-to-book as an additional control variable
Mbrank -0.14
(-1.68)*
-0.18
(-2.04)*
-0.17
(-2.04)*
-0.20
(-2.21)*
-0.22
(-2.38)*
Other control variables
Size
Leverage 4-
ROA
S&P rating 4-
Numcov ?
Escalate 9
Other debt ?
Loan size ?
Loan month ?
Revolver
PP
N
Adi R2
1.70
(0.30)
31.73
(1.15)
-6.00
(-0.10)
17.12
(4.35)**
0.44
(0.09)
35.83
(3.03)**
-8.58
(-0.74)
-25.57
(-1.30)
-0.28
(-0.90)
-53.71
(-2.63)**
-97.55
(-3.82)**
0.35
(1.85)
314
43.8%
1.53
(0.26)
37.70
(1.45)
-6.54
(-0.48)
17.92
(4.44)**
-0.38
(-0.39)
33.84
(2.73)**
-7.76
(-0.65)
-30.33
(-1.49)
-0.32
(-0.99)
-46.47
(-2.27)* 
-59.49
(-2.44)* *
0.03
(0.18)
297
42.0%
0.72
(0.13)
38.86
(1.43)
-19.93
(-0.35)
17.81
(4.61)**
0.49
(0.10)
36.75
(3.13)**
-10.38
(-0.90)
-28.06
(-1.45)
-0.35
(-1.14)
-48.71
(-2.46)* *
-87.19
(-3.40)**
0.24
(1.38)
314
45.2%
6.09
(0.99)
38.65
(1.31)
-6.34
(-0.10)
18.12
(4.39)**
-3.37
(-0.60)
33.83
(2.59)**
0.13
(0.01)
-0.19
(-0.01)
-0.41
(-1.25)
-52.76
(-2.54)**
-102.28
(-3.72)**
0.34
(1.48)
314
44.2%
6.54
(1.06)
38.26
(1.30)
30.11
(0.47)
18.34
(4.45)**
-1.78
(-0.31)
34.65
(2.60)**
2.05
(0.16)
-3.12
(-0.11)
-0.48
(-1.46)
-55.51
(-2.67)**
-155.14
(-3.47)* 
0.80
(2.14)*
297
44.7%
** and * represent significance at 1 percent and 5 percent level for one-tailed or two-tailed tests as appropriate.
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